A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
How do natural resource windfalls affect the quality of politicalcandidates? Existing scholarship argues that non-tax public revenuehas a negative effect on the characteristics of candidates because itimpairs the capacity of voters to hold leaders accountable. This liter-ature, however, has not cons...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2018
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/18264
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18264
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18264
- Palabra clave:
- Minería de oro informal
Política
Candidatos criminales
Perú
Producción
Informal Gold mining
Politics
Crminal candidates
Peru
Minas de oro
Minería ilegal
Congresos, conferencias, etc.
- Rights
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/
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A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in PeruMinería de oro informalPolíticaCandidatos criminalesPerúProducciónInformal Gold miningPoliticsCrminal candidatesPeruMinas de oroMinería ilegalCongresos, conferencias, etc.How do natural resource windfalls affect the quality of politicalcandidates? Existing scholarship argues that non-tax public revenuehas a negative effect on the characteristics of candidates because itimpairs the capacity of voters to hold leaders accountable. This liter-ature, however, has not considered other non-tax sources of revenue,namely, the rents derived from the informal and illegal exploitation ofnatural resources. In this paper, I analyze the effects of an increaseof informal gold production in Peru. I find that in districts that havehigher levels of informal gold mining, increases in prices worsens thequality of politicians. In particular, I use novel data on the crimi-nal records of candidates to show that a spike in the price of goldattracts more criminal candidates to politics and leads elected politi-cians to be accused of committing a crime more often. Interestingly,I also find that candidates who have a criminal record are less likelyto be elected. These results suggest that information on the trajec-tories of politicians is key to improve the quality of candidates that will be elected, and that the enforcement of natural resource regula-tion is crucial to eliminate the influence of rents on the behavior ofpoliticians.Universidad del Rosario. Facultad de Economía2018-05-292018-08-08T18:52:37Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjecthttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_c94fapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18264http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18264instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURenghttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Bandiera, Antonellaoai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/182642021-06-03T00:49:02Z |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru |
title |
A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru |
spellingShingle |
A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru Minería de oro informal Política Candidatos criminales Perú Producción Informal Gold mining Politics Crminal candidates Peru Minas de oro Minería ilegal Congresos, conferencias, etc. |
title_short |
A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru |
title_full |
A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru |
title_fullStr |
A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru |
title_sort |
A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Minería de oro informal Política Candidatos criminales Perú Producción Informal Gold mining Politics Crminal candidates Peru Minas de oro Minería ilegal Congresos, conferencias, etc. |
topic |
Minería de oro informal Política Candidatos criminales Perú Producción Informal Gold mining Politics Crminal candidates Peru Minas de oro Minería ilegal Congresos, conferencias, etc. |
description |
How do natural resource windfalls affect the quality of politicalcandidates? Existing scholarship argues that non-tax public revenuehas a negative effect on the characteristics of candidates because itimpairs the capacity of voters to hold leaders accountable. This liter-ature, however, has not considered other non-tax sources of revenue,namely, the rents derived from the informal and illegal exploitation ofnatural resources. In this paper, I analyze the effects of an increaseof informal gold production in Peru. I find that in districts that havehigher levels of informal gold mining, increases in prices worsens thequality of politicians. In particular, I use novel data on the crimi-nal records of candidates to show that a spike in the price of goldattracts more criminal candidates to politics and leads elected politi-cians to be accused of committing a crime more often. Interestingly,I also find that candidates who have a criminal record are less likelyto be elected. These results suggest that information on the trajec-tories of politicians is key to improve the quality of candidates that will be elected, and that the enforcement of natural resource regula-tion is crucial to eliminate the influence of rents on the behavior ofpoliticians. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-05-29 2018-08-08T18:52:37Z |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_c94f |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18264 http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18264 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18264 http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18264 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/ |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario. Facultad de Economía |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario. Facultad de Economía |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
instname_str |
Universidad del Rosario |
institution |
Universidad del Rosario |
reponame_str |
Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
collection |
Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1803710509458915328 |