A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru

How do natural resource windfalls affect the quality of politicalcandidates? Existing scholarship argues that non-tax public revenuehas a negative effect on the characteristics of candidates because itimpairs the capacity of voters to hold leaders accountable. This liter-ature, however, has not cons...

Full description

Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2018
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/18264
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18264
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18264
Palabra clave:
Minería de oro informal
Política
Candidatos criminales
Perú
Producción
Informal Gold mining
Politics
Crminal candidates
Peru
Minas de oro
Minería ilegal
Congresos, conferencias, etc.
Rights
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/
id EDOCUR2_b2aae953032adcebfa34c49bb82a5a6a
oai_identifier_str oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/18264
network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
spelling A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in PeruMinería de oro informalPolíticaCandidatos criminalesPerúProducciónInformal Gold miningPoliticsCrminal candidatesPeruMinas de oroMinería ilegalCongresos, conferencias, etc.How do natural resource windfalls affect the quality of politicalcandidates? Existing scholarship argues that non-tax public revenuehas a negative effect on the characteristics of candidates because itimpairs the capacity of voters to hold leaders accountable. This liter-ature, however, has not considered other non-tax sources of revenue,namely, the rents derived from the informal and illegal exploitation ofnatural resources. In this paper, I analyze the effects of an increaseof informal gold production in Peru. I find that in districts that havehigher levels of informal gold mining, increases in prices worsens thequality of politicians. In particular, I use novel data on the crimi-nal records of candidates to show that a spike in the price of goldattracts more criminal candidates to politics and leads elected politi-cians to be accused of committing a crime more often. Interestingly,I also find that candidates who have a criminal record are less likelyto be elected. These results suggest that information on the trajec-tories of politicians is key to improve the quality of candidates that will be elected, and that the enforcement of natural resource regula-tion is crucial to eliminate the influence of rents on the behavior ofpoliticians.Universidad del Rosario. Facultad de Economía2018-05-292018-08-08T18:52:37Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjecthttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_c94fapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18264http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18264instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURenghttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Bandiera, Antonellaoai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/182642021-06-03T00:49:02Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
title A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
spellingShingle A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
Minería de oro informal
Política
Candidatos criminales
Perú
Producción
Informal Gold mining
Politics
Crminal candidates
Peru
Minas de oro
Minería ilegal
Congresos, conferencias, etc.
title_short A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
title_full A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
title_fullStr A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
title_full_unstemmed A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
title_sort A Bonanza for Bad Politicians: Informal Gold Mining and Criminal Candidates in Peru
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Minería de oro informal
Política
Candidatos criminales
Perú
Producción
Informal Gold mining
Politics
Crminal candidates
Peru
Minas de oro
Minería ilegal
Congresos, conferencias, etc.
topic Minería de oro informal
Política
Candidatos criminales
Perú
Producción
Informal Gold mining
Politics
Crminal candidates
Peru
Minas de oro
Minería ilegal
Congresos, conferencias, etc.
description How do natural resource windfalls affect the quality of politicalcandidates? Existing scholarship argues that non-tax public revenuehas a negative effect on the characteristics of candidates because itimpairs the capacity of voters to hold leaders accountable. This liter-ature, however, has not considered other non-tax sources of revenue,namely, the rents derived from the informal and illegal exploitation ofnatural resources. In this paper, I analyze the effects of an increaseof informal gold production in Peru. I find that in districts that havehigher levels of informal gold mining, increases in prices worsens thequality of politicians. In particular, I use novel data on the crimi-nal records of candidates to show that a spike in the price of goldattracts more criminal candidates to politics and leads elected politi-cians to be accused of committing a crime more often. Interestingly,I also find that candidates who have a criminal record are less likelyto be elected. These results suggest that information on the trajec-tories of politicians is key to improve the quality of candidates that will be elected, and that the enforcement of natural resource regula-tion is crucial to eliminate the influence of rents on the behavior ofpoliticians.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-05-29
2018-08-08T18:52:37Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_c94f
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18264
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18264
url https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18264
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18264
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad del Rosario. Facultad de Economía
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad del Rosario. Facultad de Economía
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
instname_str Universidad del Rosario
institution Universidad del Rosario
reponame_str Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
collection Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1803710509458915328