Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict

In many countries governments are helpless to prevent appropriation, whatever the degree of protection promised by the law. In this context, we use a simple model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. We find one low-income, low-wage e...

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Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2009
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/26314
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1149
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26314
Palabra clave:
Applied economics
Economics
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Abierto (Texto Completo)
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oai_identifier_str oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/26314
network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
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spelling e3fedadc-a3a3-424d-9f3d-3e69cbd9b592-1cee49975-2781-4575-883c-9e2c8326103e-12020-08-06T16:21:18Z2020-08-06T16:21:18Z2009-10-11In many countries governments are helpless to prevent appropriation, whatever the degree of protection promised by the law. In this context, we use a simple model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. We find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. We show that the peaceful equilibrium can be reached if entrepreneurs implement standard remedies for the internal principal-agent problem such as efficiency wages.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1149EISSN: 1554-8597https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26314engDe Gruyter15No. 11Peace Economics Peace Science and Public PolicyVol. 15Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy, EISSN: 1554-8597, Vol.15, No.1 (2009); pp.1-15https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/peps/15/1/article-p79.xmlAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policyinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURApplied economicsEconomicsBeyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflictMás allá del riesgo moral: el efecto de las estrategias de compensación a nivel de empresa en el conflicto económicoarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Andonova, VenetaZuleta, Hernando10336/26314oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/263142021-06-03 00:50:55.835https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict
dc.title.TranslatedTitle.spa.fl_str_mv Más allá del riesgo moral: el efecto de las estrategias de compensación a nivel de empresa en el conflicto económico
title Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict
spellingShingle Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict
Applied economics
Economics
title_short Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict
title_full Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict
title_fullStr Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict
title_full_unstemmed Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict
title_sort Beyond moral hazard: the effect of firm-level compensation strategies on economic conflict
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Applied economics
Economics
topic Applied economics
Economics
description In many countries governments are helpless to prevent appropriation, whatever the degree of protection promised by the law. In this context, we use a simple model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. We find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. We show that the peaceful equilibrium can be reached if entrepreneurs implement standard remedies for the internal principal-agent problem such as efficiency wages.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2009-10-11
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-08-06T16:21:18Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-08-06T16:21:18Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1149
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv EISSN: 1554-8597
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26314
url https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1149
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26314
identifier_str_mv EISSN: 1554-8597
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 15
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv No. 1
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 1
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 15
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy, EISSN: 1554-8597, Vol.15, No.1 (2009); pp.1-15
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/peps/15/1/article-p79.xml
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv De Gruyter
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.none.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
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