Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition

This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2008
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23247
Acceso en línea:
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23247
Palabra clave:
Gas
release
short
term
instrument
to
foster
competition
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)
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spelling e642eb11-fa8c-4f62-bea2-ba9257eab300a6bd61f5-adf7-4f52-a10c-36ce67b89861b7f1f0eb-b7de-4ddc-a982-0438b1054ad5799416416002020-05-26T00:00:36Z2020-05-26T00:00:36Z2008This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted. © Presses de Sciences Po.application/pdf0035276419506694https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23247eng486No. 3475Revue EconomiqueVol. 59Revue Economique, ISSN:00352764, 19506694, Vol.59, No.3 (2008); pp. 475-486https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-67649212631&partnerID=40&md5=dbf8ccaee52733697214297be4de2152Abierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURGasreleaseshortterminstrumenttofostercompetitionGas release as a short term instrument to foster competitionUn instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas releasearticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Chaton C.Gasmi F.Guillerminet M.-L.Oviedo Arango, Juan Daniel10336/23247oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/232472021-09-16 06:41:13.534https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
dc.title.TranslatedTitle.spa.fl_str_mv Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release
title Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
spellingShingle Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
Gas
release
short
term
instrument
to
foster
competition
title_short Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
title_full Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
title_fullStr Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
title_full_unstemmed Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
title_sort Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Gas
release
short
term
instrument
to
foster
competition
topic Gas
release
short
term
instrument
to
foster
competition
description This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted. © Presses de Sciences Po.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2008
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-26T00:00:36Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-26T00:00:36Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 00352764
19506694
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23247
identifier_str_mv 00352764
19506694
url https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23247
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 486
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv No. 3
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 475
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Revue Economique
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 59
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Revue Economique, ISSN:00352764, 19506694, Vol.59, No.3 (2008); pp. 475-486
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-67649212631&partnerID=40&md5=dbf8ccaee52733697214297be4de2152
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
_version_ 1814167692810125312

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