Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition

This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program...

Full description

Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2008
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23247
Acceso en línea:
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23247
Palabra clave:
Gas
release
short
term
instrument
to
foster
competition
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)
Description
Summary:This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted. © Presses de Sciences Po.