Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2008
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23247
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23247
- Palabra clave:
- Gas
release
short
term
instrument
to
foster
competition
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
Summary: | This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted. © Presses de Sciences Po. |
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