Allocation rules on networks
When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2012
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/10828
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10828
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10828
- Palabra clave:
- Economía
Networks
Claims problems
Egalitarianism
Proportionality
Equal sacrifice
Distribución (Teoría Económica)
Análisis coste::Beneficio
Internet (Red De Computadores)::Aspectos Económicos
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
id |
EDOCUR2_92f6bde3f9346fea31135aabe0c69e86 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/10828 |
network_acronym_str |
EDOCUR2 |
network_name_str |
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario |
repository_id_str |
|
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Allocation rules on networks |
title |
Allocation rules on networks |
spellingShingle |
Allocation rules on networks Economía Networks Claims problems Egalitarianism Proportionality Equal sacrifice Distribución (Teoría Económica) Análisis coste::Beneficio Internet (Red De Computadores)::Aspectos Económicos |
title_short |
Allocation rules on networks |
title_full |
Allocation rules on networks |
title_fullStr |
Allocation rules on networks |
title_full_unstemmed |
Allocation rules on networks |
title_sort |
Allocation rules on networks |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Economía Networks Claims problems Egalitarianism Proportionality Equal sacrifice Distribución (Teoría Económica) Análisis coste::Beneficio Internet (Red De Computadores)::Aspectos Económicos |
topic |
Economía Networks Claims problems Egalitarianism Proportionality Equal sacrifice Distribución (Teoría Económica) Análisis coste::Beneficio Internet (Red De Computadores)::Aspectos Económicos |
description |
When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give applications of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism, proportionality and equal sacrifice. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012-03 2015-09-18T18:37:43Z |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
Ilkiliç, R., & Kayi, Ç. (2012). Allocation rules on networks. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía. https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10828 Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10828 |
identifier_str_mv |
Ilkiliç, R., & Kayi, Ç. (2012). Allocation rules on networks. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía |
url |
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10828 http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10828 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009380.html |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
17 páginas Recurso electrónico application/pdf Documento |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Ambec, S. and L. Ehlers (2008). Sharing a river among satiable agents. Games and Economic Behavior 64, 35–50. Ambec, S. and Y. Sprumont (2002). Sharing a river. Journal of Economic Theory 107, 453–462. Ansink, E. and H. P. Weikard (2009). Contested water rights. European Journal of Political Economy 25, 247–260. Ansink, E. and H. P. Weikard (2011). A strategic model of social and economic networks. Social Choice and Welfare. (forthcoming). Bjørndal, E. and K. J¨ornsten (2010). Flow sharing and bankruptcy games. International Journal of Game Theory 39, 11–28. Bochet, O., R. ˙Ilkılı¸c, and H. Moulin (2010). Egalitarianism under earmark constraints. mimeo. University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland. Bochet, O., R. ˙Ilkılı¸c, H. Moulin, and J. Sethuraman (2011). Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints. Theoretical Economics. (forthcoming). Branzei, R., G. Ferrari, V. Fragnelli, and S. Tijs (2008). A flow approach to bankruptcy problems. AUCO Czech Economic Review 2, 146–153. Brown, J. (1979). The sharing problem. Operations Research 27, 324–340. Hall, N. G. and R. Vohra (1993). Towards equitable distribution via proportional equity constraints. Mathematical Programming 58, 287–294. Hoekstra, A. (2006). The global dimension of water governance: Nine reasons for global arrangements in order to cope with local problems. Value of Water Research Report Series 20. UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education. ˙Ilkılı¸c, R. (2007). Network of commons. mimeo. Maastricht University. Maastricht, the Netherlands Kar, A. and O. Kıbrıs (2008). Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 31, 641–666. Klaus, B., H. Peters, and T. Storcken (1997). Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good. Economic Theory 10, 305–333. Klaus, B., H. Peters, and T. Storcken (1998). Strategy-proof division with singlepeaked preferences and individual endowments. Social Choice and Welfare 15, 297–311. Sprumont, Y. (1991). The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 59, 509–519. Thomson, W. (2003). Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 249–297. Thomson, W. (2006). How to divide when there isnt enough: From the talmud to game theory. mimeo. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA. instname:Universidad del Rosario instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
instname_str |
Universidad del Rosario |
institution |
Universidad del Rosario |
reponame_str |
Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
collection |
Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
|
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1803710540511444992 |
spelling |
Allocation rules on networksEconomíaNetworksClaims problemsEgalitarianismProportionalityEqual sacrificeDistribución (Teoría Económica)Análisis coste::BeneficioInternet (Red De Computadores)::Aspectos EconómicosWhen allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give applications of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism, proportionality and equal sacrifice.Universidad del RosarioFacultad de Economía2012-032015-09-18T18:37:43Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_804217 páginasRecurso electrónicoapplication/pdfDocumentoIlkiliç, R., & Kayi, Ç. (2012). Allocation rules on networks. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía.https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10828 Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economíahttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10828Ambec, S. and L. Ehlers (2008). Sharing a river among satiable agents. Games and Economic Behavior 64, 35–50.Ambec, S. and Y. Sprumont (2002). Sharing a river. Journal of Economic Theory 107, 453–462.Ansink, E. and H. P. Weikard (2009). Contested water rights. European Journal of Political Economy 25, 247–260.Ansink, E. and H. P. Weikard (2011). A strategic model of social and economic networks. Social Choice and Welfare. (forthcoming).Bjørndal, E. and K. J¨ornsten (2010). Flow sharing and bankruptcy games. International Journal of Game Theory 39, 11–28.Bochet, O., R. ˙Ilkılı¸c, and H. Moulin (2010). Egalitarianism under earmark constraints. mimeo. University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland.Bochet, O., R. ˙Ilkılı¸c, H. Moulin, and J. Sethuraman (2011). Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints. Theoretical Economics. (forthcoming).Branzei, R., G. Ferrari, V. Fragnelli, and S. Tijs (2008). A flow approach to bankruptcy problems. AUCO Czech Economic Review 2, 146–153.Brown, J. (1979). The sharing problem. Operations Research 27, 324–340.Hall, N. G. and R. Vohra (1993). Towards equitable distribution via proportional equity constraints. Mathematical Programming 58, 287–294.Hoekstra, A. (2006). The global dimension of water governance: Nine reasons for global arrangements in order to cope with local problems. Value of Water Research Report Series 20. UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education.˙Ilkılı¸c, R. (2007). Network of commons. mimeo. Maastricht University. Maastricht, the NetherlandsKar, A. and O. Kıbrıs (2008). Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 31, 641–666.Klaus, B., H. Peters, and T. Storcken (1997). Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good. Economic Theory 10, 305–333.Klaus, B., H. Peters, and T. Storcken (1998). Strategy-proof division with singlepeaked preferences and individual endowments. Social Choice and Welfare 15, 297–311.Sprumont, Y. (1991). The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 59, 509–519.Thomson, W. (2003). Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 249–297.Thomson, W. (2006). How to divide when there isnt enough: From the talmud to game theory. mimeo. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA.instname:Universidad del Rosarioinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspahttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009380.htmlhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Ilkiliç, RahmiKayi, Cagatayoai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/108282021-09-06T23:58:23Z |