La constitución de objetos físicos en el Aufbau: quine contra CARNAP
In this paper it is argued that Quine's critic of Carnap's radical reductionism ("the second dogma of empiricism") is based on an incomplete comprehension of the project that Carnap pursued in the Aufbau. This paper offers a novel interpretation of the twelve steps that Carnap pr...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2010
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23784
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23784
- Palabra clave:
- Color
Logical construction
Qualities
Sensation
World-point
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
| Summary: | In this paper it is argued that Quine's critic of Carnap's radical reductionism ("the second dogma of empiricism") is based on an incomplete comprehension of the project that Carnap pursued in the Aufbau. This paper offers a novel interpretation of the twelve steps that Carnap proposed for the construction of physical objects. Further, a recent proposal of Thomas Mormann concerning this issue is criticized. |
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