Information provision in procurement auctions
We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid co...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/10997
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10997
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10997
- Palabra clave:
- Producción
Economía
Contratos::Aspectos Económicos
Oferta y demanda
Información::Aspectos Económicos
Política de precios
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
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Information provision in procurement auctionsProducciónEconomíaContratos::Aspectos EconómicosOferta y demandaInformación::Aspectos EconómicosPolítica de preciosWe analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.Universidad del RosarioFacultad de Economía20132015-10-09T20:34:55Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_804222 páginasRecurso electrónicoapplication/pdfDocumentohttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10997 Universidad del Rosariohttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10997instname:Universidad del Rosarioinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURenghttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000091/011006.htmlhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Coleff, JoaquínGarcía, Danieloai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/109972021-06-03T00:46:38Z |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
title |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
spellingShingle |
Information provision in procurement auctions Producción Economía Contratos::Aspectos Económicos Oferta y demanda Información::Aspectos Económicos Política de precios |
title_short |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
title_full |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
title_fullStr |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
title_full_unstemmed |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
title_sort |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Producción Economía Contratos::Aspectos Económicos Oferta y demanda Información::Aspectos Económicos Política de precios |
topic |
Producción Economía Contratos::Aspectos Económicos Oferta y demanda Información::Aspectos Económicos Política de precios |
description |
We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013 2015-10-09T20:34:55Z |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10997 Universidad del Rosario http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10997 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10997 http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10997 |
identifier_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000091/011006.html |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
22 páginas Recurso electrónico application/pdf Documento |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad del Rosario instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
instname_str |
Universidad del Rosario |
institution |
Universidad del Rosario |
reponame_str |
Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
collection |
Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1803710396199075840 |