My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement

Este trabajo examina el impacto de la llegada de un nuevo partido político al poder local sobre la contratación pública y el desempeño municipal en Colombia. Utilizando un diseño de regresión discontinua basado en elecciones cercanas entre 2011 y 2019, encuentro un aumento en las tasas de contrataci...

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Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2023
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
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oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/40198
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_40198
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/40198
Palabra clave:
Elecciones
Contratación
Discrecional
Personal público
Desempeño municipal
Selección de personal
Elections
Recruitment
Discretionary
Public personnel
Municipal performance
Personnel selection
Rights
License
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement
title My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement
spellingShingle My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement
Elecciones
Contratación
Discrecional
Personal público
Desempeño municipal
Selección de personal
Elections
Recruitment
Discretionary
Public personnel
Municipal performance
Personnel selection
title_short My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement
title_full My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement
title_fullStr My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement
title_full_unstemmed My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement
title_sort My Guys: the Impact of political turnover on municipal public procurement
dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Elecciones
Contratación
Discrecional
Personal público
Desempeño municipal
Selección de personal
topic Elecciones
Contratación
Discrecional
Personal público
Desempeño municipal
Selección de personal
Elections
Recruitment
Discretionary
Public personnel
Municipal performance
Personnel selection
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Elections
Recruitment
Discretionary
Public personnel
Municipal performance
Personnel selection
description Este trabajo examina el impacto de la llegada de un nuevo partido político al poder local sobre la contratación pública y el desempeño municipal en Colombia. Utilizando un diseño de regresión discontinua basado en elecciones cercanas entre 2011 y 2019, encuentro un aumento en las tasas de contratación de nuevo personal público discrecional a través de contratos temporales. La magnitud de este efecto varía según el nivel de pobreza. Además, los salarios de los contratistas se enfrentan a un efecto adverso, particularmente para aquellos empleados contratados dentro del gobierno anterior. Estos resultados ponen de manifiesto el uso excesivo de prácticas de contratación discrecional y su efecto sobre la calidad de los empleos. Sin embargo, no se observan efectos sobre el rendimiento municipal a corto plazo.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2023-07-19T13:46:58Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2023-07-19T13:46:58Z
dc.date.created.none.fl_str_mv 2023-07-07
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv bachelorThesis
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1f
dc.type.document.none.fl_str_mv Trabajo de grado
dc.type.spa.none.fl_str_mv Trabajo de grado
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_40198
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/40198
url https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_40198
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/40198
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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dc.rights.acceso.none.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
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rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 47 pp
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.department.spa.fl_str_mv Facultad de Economía
dc.publisher.program.spa.fl_str_mv Maestría en Economía
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.bibliographicCitation.none.fl_str_mv Akhtari, M., Moreira, D., and Trucco, L. (2022). Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services. American Economic Review, 112(2):442–493.
Alesina, A., Carrasquilla, A., and Echavarria, J. (2005). Decentralization in colombia. Fedesarrollo.
Ashraf, N. and Bandiera, O. (2018). Social incentives in organizations. Annual Review of Economics, 10(1):439–463.
Barbosa, K. and Ferreira, F. V. (2019). Occupy Government: Democracy and the Dynamics of Personnel Decisions and Public Sector Performance. Number no. w25501 in NBER working paper series. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bernal, R., Gonzales, J., Henao, J., Mendeléz, M., Montenegro, A., Ramírez, J., Uribe, J., and Villar, L. (2017). Comisión del gasto y la inversión pública. informe final. Fedesarrollo.
Bhavnani, R. and Lee, A. (2017). Local embeddedness and bureaucratic performance: Evidence from india. The Journal of Politics, 80:000–000.
Bursztyn, L. (2016). Poverty and the political economy of public education spending: evidence from Brazil. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14:1101–1128.
Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., Farrell, M. H., and Titiunik, R. (2019). Regression Discontinuity Designs Using Covariates. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 101(3):442–451.
Cattaneo, M. D., M., J., and X., M. (2018). Manipulation testing based on density discontinuity. Stata Journal, 18(1):234–261(28).
Colonnelli, E., Prem, M., and Teso, E. (2020). Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations. American Economic Review, 110(10):3071–3099.
Dal B´o, E., Finan, F., and Rossi, M. A. (2013). Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(3):1169–1218.
Evans, P. and Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of ”weberian” state structures on economic growth. American Sociological Review, 64(5):748–765.
Fafchamps, M. and Labonne, J. (2017). Do politicians’ relatives get better jobs? evidence from municipal elections. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 33:268–300.
Fagernäs, S. and Pelkonen, P. (2020). Teachers, Electoral Cycles, and Learning in India. Journal of Human Resources, 55(2):699–732.
Finan, F., Olken, B., and Pande, R. (2017). Chapter 6 - the personnel economics of the developing state. In Banerjee, A. V. and Duflo, E., editors, Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, volume 2 of Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, pages 467–514. North- Holland.
Finan, F., Olken, B. A., and Pande, R. (2015). The personnel economics of the state. Working Paper 21825, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Folke, O., Hirano, S., and Snyder, J. M. (2011). Patronage and Elections in U.S. States. American Political Science Review, 105(3):567–585.
Forquesato, P. (2022). Who Benefits from Political Connections in Brazilian Municipalities. Publisher: arXiv Version Number: 1.
Iyer, L. and Mani, A. (2012). Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(3):723–739.
Lewis, D. E. (2011). Presidential Appointments and Personnel. Annual Review of Political Science, 14(1):47–66.
Marx, B., Pons, V., and Rollet, V. (2022). Electoral Turnovers. NBER working paper series. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Olken, B. A. and Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in developing countries. Annual Review of Economics, 4(1).
Rauch, J. E. and Evans, P. B. (2000). Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. Journal of Public Economics, 75(1):49–71.
Xu, G. (2018). The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire. American Economic Review, 108(11):3170–3198.
Zuleta, M. M. and Caro, C. A. (2020). Mirada a las alertas de riesgo de corrupción del sistema de compra pública colombiano identificadas en el cálculo del índice con la metodología del imco. Fedesarrollo.
Pabón, M., Mancera, C., and A., C. (2021). Contratación directa, ¿excepción o regla en Colombia? Misión de Observación Electoral.
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spelling Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando79950223600Bermúdez Vásquez, David AlejandroMagíster en EconomíaMaestría2a19e997-fcdb-4957-bcc0-3194c0e34a30-12023-07-19T13:46:58Z2023-07-19T13:46:58Z2023-07-07Este trabajo examina el impacto de la llegada de un nuevo partido político al poder local sobre la contratación pública y el desempeño municipal en Colombia. Utilizando un diseño de regresión discontinua basado en elecciones cercanas entre 2011 y 2019, encuentro un aumento en las tasas de contratación de nuevo personal público discrecional a través de contratos temporales. La magnitud de este efecto varía según el nivel de pobreza. Además, los salarios de los contratistas se enfrentan a un efecto adverso, particularmente para aquellos empleados contratados dentro del gobierno anterior. Estos resultados ponen de manifiesto el uso excesivo de prácticas de contratación discrecional y su efecto sobre la calidad de los empleos. Sin embargo, no se observan efectos sobre el rendimiento municipal a corto plazo.This paper examines the impact of a new political party's arrival in local power on public procurement and municipal performance in Colombia. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections from 2011 to 2019, I find an increase in the hiring rates of new discretionary public personnel through temporary contracts. The magnitude of this effect varies according to the level of poverty. Additionally, contractor wages face an adverse effect, particularly for those employed within the previous government. These findings highlight the excessive use of discretionary contracting practices and their effect on the quality of jobs. However, there are no effects on the short-term's municipal performance.47 ppapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_40198 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/40198engUniversidad del RosarioFacultad de EconomíaMaestría en EconomíaAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 InternationalAbierto (Texto Completo)EL AUTOR, manifiesta que la obra objeto de la presente autorización es original y la realizó sin violar o usurpar derechos de autor de terceros, por lo tanto la obra es de exclusiva autoría y tiene la titularidad sobre la misma. PARGRAFO: En caso de presentarse cualquier reclamación o acción por parte de un tercero en cuanto a los derechos de autor sobre la obra en cuestión, EL AUTOR, asumirá toda la responsabilidad, y saldrá en defensa de los derechos aquí autorizados; para todos los efectos la universidad actúa como un tercero de buena fe. EL AUTOR, autoriza a LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO, para que en los términos establecidos en la Ley 23 de 1982, Ley 44 de 1993, Decisión andina 351 de 1993, Decreto 460 de 1995 y demás normas generales sobre la materia, utilice y use la obra objeto de la presente autorización. -------------------------------------- POLITICA DE TRATAMIENTO DE DATOS PERSONALES. Declaro que autorizo previa y de forma informada el tratamiento de mis datos personales por parte de LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO para fines académicos y en aplicación de convenios con terceros o servicios conexos con actividades propias de la academia, con estricto cumplimiento de los principios de ley. Para el correcto ejercicio de mi derecho de habeas data cuento con la cuenta de correo habeasdata@urosario.edu.co, donde previa identificación podré solicitar la consulta, corrección y supresión de mis datos.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Akhtari, M., Moreira, D., and Trucco, L. (2022). Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services. American Economic Review, 112(2):442–493.Alesina, A., Carrasquilla, A., and Echavarria, J. (2005). Decentralization in colombia. Fedesarrollo.Ashraf, N. and Bandiera, O. (2018). Social incentives in organizations. Annual Review of Economics, 10(1):439–463.Barbosa, K. and Ferreira, F. V. (2019). Occupy Government: Democracy and the Dynamics of Personnel Decisions and Public Sector Performance. Number no. w25501 in NBER working paper series. National Bureau of Economic Research.Bernal, R., Gonzales, J., Henao, J., Mendeléz, M., Montenegro, A., Ramírez, J., Uribe, J., and Villar, L. (2017). Comisión del gasto y la inversión pública. informe final. Fedesarrollo.Bhavnani, R. and Lee, A. (2017). Local embeddedness and bureaucratic performance: Evidence from india. The Journal of Politics, 80:000–000.Bursztyn, L. (2016). Poverty and the political economy of public education spending: evidence from Brazil. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14:1101–1128.Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., Farrell, M. H., and Titiunik, R. (2019). Regression Discontinuity Designs Using Covariates. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 101(3):442–451.Cattaneo, M. D., M., J., and X., M. (2018). Manipulation testing based on density discontinuity. Stata Journal, 18(1):234–261(28).Colonnelli, E., Prem, M., and Teso, E. (2020). Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations. American Economic Review, 110(10):3071–3099.Dal B´o, E., Finan, F., and Rossi, M. A. (2013). Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(3):1169–1218.Evans, P. and Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of ”weberian” state structures on economic growth. American Sociological Review, 64(5):748–765.Fafchamps, M. and Labonne, J. (2017). Do politicians’ relatives get better jobs? evidence from municipal elections. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 33:268–300.Fagernäs, S. and Pelkonen, P. (2020). Teachers, Electoral Cycles, and Learning in India. Journal of Human Resources, 55(2):699–732.Finan, F., Olken, B., and Pande, R. (2017). Chapter 6 - the personnel economics of the developing state. In Banerjee, A. V. and Duflo, E., editors, Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, volume 2 of Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, pages 467–514. North- Holland.Finan, F., Olken, B. A., and Pande, R. (2015). The personnel economics of the state. Working Paper 21825, National Bureau of Economic Research.Folke, O., Hirano, S., and Snyder, J. M. (2011). Patronage and Elections in U.S. States. American Political Science Review, 105(3):567–585.Forquesato, P. (2022). Who Benefits from Political Connections in Brazilian Municipalities. Publisher: arXiv Version Number: 1.Iyer, L. and Mani, A. (2012). Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(3):723–739.Lewis, D. E. (2011). Presidential Appointments and Personnel. Annual Review of Political Science, 14(1):47–66.Marx, B., Pons, V., and Rollet, V. (2022). Electoral Turnovers. NBER working paper series. National Bureau of Economic Research.Olken, B. A. and Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in developing countries. Annual Review of Economics, 4(1).Rauch, J. E. and Evans, P. B. (2000). Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. Journal of Public Economics, 75(1):49–71.Xu, G. (2018). The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire. American Economic Review, 108(11):3170–3198.Zuleta, M. M. and Caro, C. A. (2020). Mirada a las alertas de riesgo de corrupción del sistema de compra pública colombiano identificadas en el cálculo del índice con la metodología del imco. Fedesarrollo.Pabón, M., Mancera, C., and A., C. (2021). Contratación directa, ¿excepción o regla en Colombia? 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