Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign

Este documento analiza las decisiones matrimoniales de hombres y mujeres, enfocándose en el atractivo adicional del saneamiento dentro del arreglo de vivienda, en la India rural. Aprovechamos la variación de distrito y de tiempo de la Campaña de Saneamiento Total (TSC) que aumentó el saneamiento en...

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Fecha de publicación:: 2021

Institución:: Universidad del Rosario

Repositorio:: Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario

Idioma:: eng

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network_acronym_str	EDOCUR2
network_name_str	Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign Mercados de saneamiento y matrimonio en la India: evidencia de la campaña de saneamiento total
title	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign
spellingShingle	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign Emparejamiento empírico Mercados matrimoniales Saneamiento Clasificación Economía doméstica & vida familiar C78 D13 J12 O18 Empirical matching Marriage markets Sanitation Sorting
title_short	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign
title_full	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign
title_fullStr	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign
title_full_unstemmed	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign
title_sort	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv	Emparejamiento empírico Mercados matrimoniales Saneamiento Clasificación Economía doméstica & vida familiar C78 D13 J12 O18 Empirical matching Marriage markets Sanitation Sorting
topic	Emparejamiento empírico Mercados matrimoniales Saneamiento Clasificación Economía doméstica & vida familiar C78 D13 J12 O18 Empirical matching Marriage markets Sanitation Sorting
description	Este documento analiza las decisiones matrimoniales de hombres y mujeres, enfocándose en el atractivo adicional del saneamiento dentro del arreglo de vivienda, en la India rural. Aprovechamos la variación de distrito y de tiempo de la Campaña de Saneamiento Total (TSC) que aumentó el saneamiento en un 6,6 por ciento entre los hogares con hijos elegibles para casarse y generó un aumento exógeno en la composición de los hogares con saneamiento. Utilizando datos de la Encuesta de Hogares de Desarrollo Humano de la India (IHDS) y el censo a nivel de distrito, mostramos que la exposición al CET aumentó la probabilidad de matrimonio de hombres y mujeres de hogares más pobres en 3.8 pp y 6.5 pp respectivamente. Las estimaciones en forma reducida incorporan tanto efectos de equilibrio general como efectos de programas heterogéneos, dos componentes importantes del comportamiento marital de equilibrio. Para descomponer el impacto general de la política en el equilibrio del mercado matrimonial, formulamos un modelo de emparejamiento simple en el que hombres y mujeres coinciden en características observadas y no observadas. A través de simulaciones de modelos, mostramos que las cohortes dentro de los mercados expuestos a TSC experimentaron un cambio en las ganancias conyugales tanto entre los partidos como dentro de un partido determinado. Específicamente, los patrones de clasificación resultantes muestran una marcada asimetría de género con un aumento en el excedente conyugal entre parejas donde los hombres son más ricos que su cónyuge, y una disminución en el excedente cuando la esposa es más rica. Además, el mayor acceso al saneamiento para las mujeres expuestas a TSC implicó una disminución en su control esperado sobre los recursos dentro del matrimonio.
publishDate	2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv	2021-09-26 2021-09-28T13:45:57Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
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dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv	https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_32571 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/32571
url	https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_32571 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/32571
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv	eng
language	eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv	https://www.dropbox.com/s/zn0u9hwb9i375el/ABGR_Sept2021_draft.pdf?dl=0 https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/019624.html
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
rights_invalid_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv	35 pp. application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv	Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía
publisher.none.fl_str_mv	Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv	Abramitzky, R., Delavande, A., and Vasconcelos, L. (2011). Marrying up: the role of sex ratio in assortative matching. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(3):124–57. Abramovsky, L., Augsburg, B., Luuhrmann, M., Oteiza, F., and Rud, J. P. (2019). Community matters: heterogenous impacts of a sanitation intervention. Adams-Prassl, A. and Andrew, A. (2019). Preferences and beliefs in the marriage market for young brides André, P. and Dupraz, Y. (2019). Education and polygamy: Evidence from Cameroon. Technical report, Warwick Economics Research Papers No 1219 Andres, L. A., Deb, S., Joseph, G., Larenas, M. I., and Grabinsky Zabludovsky, J. (2020). A multiple-arm, cluster-randomized impact evaluation of the Clean India (Swachh Bharat) Mission program in rural Punjab, India. Working Paper 9249, World Bank" Angrist, J. (2002). How do sex ratios affect marriage and labor markets? Evidence from America’s second generation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3):997–1038 Arnold, B. F., Khush, R. S., Ramaswamy, P., London, A. G., Rajkumar, P., Ramaprabha, P., Durairaj, N., Hubbard, A. E., Balakrishnan, K., and Colford, J. M. (2010). Causal inference methods to study nonrandomized, preexisting development interventions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(52):22605–22610 Augsburg, B. and Sainati, T. (2020). Editorial: WASH economics and financing: towards a better understanding of costs and benefits. Journal of WASH for Development, 10:615—-617 Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Ghatak, M., and Lafortune, J. (2013). Marry for what? Caste and mate selection in modern India. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2):33–72 Barnard, S., Routray, P., Majorin, F., Peletz, R., Boisson, S., Sinha, A., and Clasen, T. (2013). Impact of Indian Total Sanitation Campaign on latrine coverage and use: A cross-sectional study in Orissa three years following programme implementation. PLOS One, 8 Basu, A. (1999). Fertility decline and increasing gender imbalance in India, including a possible South Indian turnaround. Development and Change, 30:237–263 Beauchamp, A., Calvi, R., and Fulford, S. (2017). Terms of engagement: Marriage and migration in India. In Structural Models in Development: Migration, Marriage and the Family. Econometric Society Becker, G. S. and Becker, G. S. (2009). A Treatise on the Family. Harvard university press. Borker, G., Eeckout, J., Luke, N., Minz, S., Munshi, K., and Swaminathan, S. (2018). Wealth, marriage, and sex selection. PAA 2018 Annual Meeting Borker, G., Eeckout, J., Luke, N., Minz, S., Munshi, K., and Swaminathan, S. (2019). Wealth, marriage, and sex selection. Working paper. Botticini, M. and Siow, A. (2003). Why dowries? American Economic Review, 93(4):1385–1398. Briceno, B., Coville, A., Gertler, P., and Martinez, S. (2017). Are there synergies from combining hygiene and sanitation promotion campaigns: Evidence from a large-scale cluster-randomized trial in rural Tanzania. PLoS One, 12(11):e0186228 Cavill, S., Mott, J., Tyndale-Biscoe, P., Bond, M., Edström, J., Huggett, C., and Wamera, E. (2018). Men and boys in sanitation and hygiene: A desk-based review. CLTS Knowledge Hub and Learning Paper, Institute of Development Studies. CBGA, U. (2011). Total sanitation campaign (TSC). budgeting for change series, 2011. Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability; Social Policy, Planning, Monitoring and evaluation (SPPME), UNICEF Charles, K. K. and Luoh, M. C. (2010). Male incarceration, the marriage market, and female outcomes. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(3):614–627 Chiappori, P.-A., Dias, M. C., and Meghir, C. (2018). The marriage market, labor supply, and education choice. Journal of Political Economy, 126(S1):S26–S72 Chiappori, P.-A., Iyigun, M., and Weiss, Y. (2009). Investment in schooling and the marriage market. American Economic Review, 99(5):1689–1713 Chiappori, P.-A., Oreffice, S., and Quintana-Domeque, C. (2012). Fatter attraction: anthropometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage market. Journal of Political Economy, 120(4):659–695. Chiappori, P.-A., Salanié, B., and Weiss, Y. (2017). Partner choice, investment in children, and the marital college premium. American Economic Review, 107(8):2109–67 Choo, E. and Siow, A. (2006). Who marries whom and why. Journal of political Economy, 114(1):175–201 Clasen, T., Boisson, S., Routray, P., Torondel, B., Bell, M., Cumming, O., Ensink, J., Freeman, M., Jenkins, M., Odagiri, M., et al. (2014). Effectiveness of a rural sanitation programme on diarrhoea, soiltransmitted helminth infection, and child malnutrition in Odisha, India: A cluster-randomised trial. The Lancet Global Health, 2(11):e645–e653 Cox, O. C. (1940). Sex ratio and marital status among negroes. American Sociological Review, 6(5):937–947 Crocker, J. (2016). Teachers and sanitation promotion: An assessment of community-led total sanitation in Ethiopia. Environmental Science and Technology, 50(12) Crocker, J., Abodoo, E., Asamani, D., Domapielle, W., Gyapong, B., and Bartram, J. (2016). Impact evaluation of training Natural Leaders during a Community-Led Total sanitation intervention: A clusterrandomized field trial in Ghana. Environ. Sci. Technol., 50(16):8867–8875 Das Gupta, M., Zhenghua, J., Bohua, L., Zhenming, X., Chung, W., and Hwa-Ok, B. (2003). Why is son preference so persistent in East and South Asia? A cross-country study of China, India and the Republic of Korea. The Journal of Development Studies, 40:153–187 Desai, S. and Andrist, L. (2010). Erratum: Fatter attraction: Anthropometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage market. Demography, 47:667–687 Easterlin, R. A. (1961). The American baby boom in historical perspective. American Economic Review, 51(5):869–911 Fernández, R. and Wong, J. C. (2017). Free to leave? A welfare analysis of divorce regimes. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(3):72–115 Garn, J. V., Sclar, G. D., Freeman, M. C., Penakalapati, G., Alexander, K. T., Brooks, P., Rehfuess, E. A., Boisson, S., Medlicott, K. O., and Clasen, T. F. (2017). The impact of sanitation interventions on latrine coverage and latrine use: A systematic review and meta-analysis. International journal of hygiene and environmental health, 220(2):329–340 Gautam, S. (2017). Household Demand in the Presence of Externalities: Model and Applications. PhD thesis, University College London, United Kingdom Gautam, S. (2020). Quantifying welfare effects in the presence of externalities: An ex-ante evaluation of sanitation interventions. Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis Greenwood, J., Guner, N., Kocharkov, G., and Santos, C. (2016). Technology and the changing family: A unified model of marriage, divorce, educational attainment, and married female labor-force participation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 8(1):1–41 Grossbard, S. (1993). On the economics of marriage-a theory of marriage, labor and divorce. MPRA Paper, 1832 Guiteras, R., Levinsohn, J., and Mobarak, A. M. (2015). Sanitation subsidies. encouraging sanitation investment in the developing world: A cluster-randomized trial. Science, 348(6237):903–906 Gupta, B. (2014). Where have all the brides gone? Son preference and marriage in India over the twentieth century. The Economic History Review, 67(1):1–24 Hammer, J. S. and Spears, D. (2016). Village sanitation and children’s human capital: evidence from a randomized experiment by the Maharashtra government. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6580 Hener, T. and Wilson, T. (2018). Marital age gaps and educational homogamy-evidence from a compulsory schooling reform in the UK. Technical report, ifo Working Paper Hitsch, G. J., Hortaçsu, A., and Ariely, D. (2010). Matching and sorting in online dating. American Economic Review, 100(1):130–63 Iyigun, M. and Walsh, R. P. (2007). Endogenous gender power, household labor supply and the demographic transition. Journal of Development Economics, 82(1):138–155 Jaggi, T. (2001). The economics of dowry: Causes and effects of an Indian tradition. University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics, 5(1):2 Kone, Z. L., Liu, M. Y., Mattoo, A., Ozden, C., and Sharma, S. (2018). Internal borders and migration in India. Journal of Economic Geography, 18(4):729–759 Lundberg, S. and Pollak, R. A. (1996). Bargaining and distribution in marriage. Journal of economic perspectives, 10(4):139–158 Moorjani, P., Thangaraj, K., Patterson, N., Lipson, M., Loh, P.-R., Govindaraj, P., Berger, B., Reich, D., and Singh, L. (2013). Genetic evidence for recent population mixture in India. The American Journal of Human Genetics, 93(3):422–438 Murthi, M., Guio, A.-C., and Dréze, J. (1995). Mortality, fertility, and gender bias in India: A district level analysis. Population and Development Review, pages 745–782 Orgill-Meyer, J. and Pattanayak, S. K. (2020). Improved sanitation increases long-term cognitive test scores. World Development, 132(104975) Patil, S. R., Arnold, B. F., Salvatore, A. L., Briceno, B., Ganguly, S., Colford Jr, J. M., and Gertler, P. J. (2014). The effect of India’s Total Sanitation Campaign on defecation behaviors and child health in rural Madhya Pradesh: A cluster randomized controlled trial. PLoS Med, 11(8):e1001709 Pattanayak, S. K., Yang, J.-C., Dickinson, K. L., Poulos, C., Patil, S. R., Mallick, R. K., Blitstein, J. L., and Praharaj, P. (2009). Shame or subsidy revisited: social mobilization for sanitation in orissa, india. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 87:580–587 Pencavel, J. (1998). Assortative mating by schooling and the work behavior of wives and husbands. The American Economic Review, 88(2):326–329 Pickering, A. J., Djebbari, H., Lopez, C., Coulibaly, M., and Alzua, M. L. (2015). Effect of a CommunityLed Sanitation intervention on child diarrhoea and child growth in rural Mali: A cluster-randomised controlled trial. The Lancet Global Health, 3(11):e701–e711 Radtke, I. (2018). WASH guidelines for field practitioners. Part 2: Sanitation. Malteser Inernational Rao, V. (1993). The rising price of husbands: A hedonic analysis of dowry increases in rural India. Journal of political Economy, 101(4):666–677 Rasul, I. (2006). Marriage markets and divorce laws. Journal of Law, Economics, and organization, 22(1):30–69. Reynoso, A. (2018). The impact of divorce laws on the equilibrium in the marriage market. University of Michigan, Job Market Paper. Spears, D. and Lamba, S. (2016). Effects of early-life exposure to sanitation on childhood cognitive skills: Evidence from India’s Total Sanitation Campaign. Journal of Human Resources, 51(2):298–327 Stopnitzky, Y. (2017). No toilet no bride? Intrahousehold bargaining in male-skewed marriage markets in India. Journal of Development Economics, 127:269–282 Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) (2011). A decade of the Total Sanitation Campaign: Rapid assessment of processes and outcomes. Volume 1: Main Report Zha, D. (2019). Schooling expansion and the female marriage age: Evidence from Indonesia. Columbia University, Job Market Paper instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
instname_str	Universidad del Rosario
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spelling	Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation CampaignMercados de saneamiento y matrimonio en la India: evidencia de la campaña de saneamiento totalEmparejamiento empíricoMercados matrimonialesSaneamientoClasificaciónEconomía doméstica & vida familiarC78D13J12O18Empirical matchingMarriage marketsSanitationSortingEste documento analiza las decisiones matrimoniales de hombres y mujeres, enfocándose en el atractivo adicional del saneamiento dentro del arreglo de vivienda, en la India rural. Aprovechamos la variación de distrito y de tiempo de la Campaña de Saneamiento Total (TSC) que aumentó el saneamiento en un 6,6 por ciento entre los hogares con hijos elegibles para casarse y generó un aumento exógeno en la composición de los hogares con saneamiento. Utilizando datos de la Encuesta de Hogares de Desarrollo Humano de la India (IHDS) y el censo a nivel de distrito, mostramos que la exposición al CET aumentó la probabilidad de matrimonio de hombres y mujeres de hogares más pobres en 3.8 pp y 6.5 pp respectivamente. Las estimaciones en forma reducida incorporan tanto efectos de equilibrio general como efectos de programas heterogéneos, dos componentes importantes del comportamiento marital de equilibrio. Para descomponer el impacto general de la política en el equilibrio del mercado matrimonial, formulamos un modelo de emparejamiento simple en el que hombres y mujeres coinciden en características observadas y no observadas. A través de simulaciones de modelos, mostramos que las cohortes dentro de los mercados expuestos a TSC experimentaron un cambio en las ganancias conyugales tanto entre los partidos como dentro de un partido determinado. Específicamente, los patrones de clasificación resultantes muestran una marcada asimetría de género con un aumento en el excedente conyugal entre parejas donde los hombres son más ricos que su cónyuge, y una disminución en el excedente cuando la esposa es más rica. Además, el mayor acceso al saneamiento para las mujeres expuestas a TSC implicó una disminución en su control esperado sobre los recursos dentro del matrimonio.This paper analyses the marriage decisions of men and women, focusing on the added attractiveness of sanitation within the living arrangement, in rural India. We exploit district and time variation from the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) which increased sanitation by 6.6 percent among households with marriage eligible children and generated an exogenous increase in the composition of households with sanitation. Using data from the Indian Human Development household survey (IHDS) and district level census, we show that exposure to TSC increased the probability of marriage for men and women, from poorer households, by 3.8 pp and 6.5 pp respectively. The reduced form estimates incorporate both general equilibrium effects and heterogeneous program effects – two important components of equilibrium marital behavior. To decompose the overall policy impact on marriage market equilibrium we formulate a simple matching model where men and women match on observed and unobserved characteristics. Through model simulations, we show that cohorts within TSC exposed markets experienced a shift in marital gains both across matches but also within a given match. Specifically, the resultant sorting patterns display a marked gender asymmetry with an increase in marital surplus among matches where men are wealthier than their spouse, and a decrease in surplus where the wife is wealthier. Moreover, the increased access to sanitation for TSC exposed women implied a decline in their expected control over resources within the marriage.Universidad del RosarioFacultad de Economía2021-09-262021-09-28T13:45:57Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bccehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_804235 pp.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_32571 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/32571Abramitzky, R., Delavande, A., and Vasconcelos, L. (2011). Marrying up: the role of sex ratio in assortative matching. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(3):124–57.Abramovsky, L., Augsburg, B., Luuhrmann, M., Oteiza, F., and Rud, J. P. (2019). Community matters: heterogenous impacts of a sanitation intervention.Adams-Prassl, A. and Andrew, A. (2019). Preferences and beliefs in the marriage market for young bridesAndré, P. and Dupraz, Y. (2019). Education and polygamy: Evidence from Cameroon. Technical report, Warwick Economics Research Papers No 1219Andres, L. A., Deb, S., Joseph, G., Larenas, M. I., and Grabinsky Zabludovsky, J. (2020). A multiple-arm, cluster-randomized impact evaluation of the Clean India (Swachh Bharat) Mission program in rural Punjab, India. Working Paper 9249, World Bank"Angrist, J. (2002). How do sex ratios affect marriage and labor markets? Evidence from America’s second generation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3):997–1038Arnold, B. F., Khush, R. S., Ramaswamy, P., London, A. G., Rajkumar, P., Ramaprabha, P., Durairaj, N., Hubbard, A. E., Balakrishnan, K., and Colford, J. M. (2010). Causal inference methods to study nonrandomized, preexisting development interventions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(52):22605–22610Augsburg, B. and Sainati, T. (2020). Editorial: WASH economics and financing: towards a better understanding of costs and benefits. Journal of WASH for Development, 10:615—-617Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Ghatak, M., and Lafortune, J. (2013). Marry for what? Caste and mate selection in modern India. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2):33–72Barnard, S., Routray, P., Majorin, F., Peletz, R., Boisson, S., Sinha, A., and Clasen, T. (2013). Impact of Indian Total Sanitation Campaign on latrine coverage and use: A cross-sectional study in Orissa three years following programme implementation. PLOS One, 8Basu, A. (1999). Fertility decline and increasing gender imbalance in India, including a possible South Indian turnaround. Development and Change, 30:237–263Beauchamp, A., Calvi, R., and Fulford, S. (2017). Terms of engagement: Marriage and migration in India. In Structural Models in Development: Migration, Marriage and the Family. Econometric SocietyBecker, G. S. and Becker, G. S. (2009). A Treatise on the Family. Harvard university press.Borker, G., Eeckout, J., Luke, N., Minz, S., Munshi, K., and Swaminathan, S. (2018). Wealth, marriage, and sex selection. PAA 2018 Annual MeetingBorker, G., Eeckout, J., Luke, N., Minz, S., Munshi, K., and Swaminathan, S. (2019). Wealth, marriage, and sex selection. Working paper.Botticini, M. and Siow, A. (2003). Why dowries? American Economic Review, 93(4):1385–1398.Briceno, B., Coville, A., Gertler, P., and Martinez, S. (2017). Are there synergies from combining hygiene and sanitation promotion campaigns: Evidence from a large-scale cluster-randomized trial in rural Tanzania. PLoS One, 12(11):e0186228Cavill, S., Mott, J., Tyndale-Biscoe, P., Bond, M., Edström, J., Huggett, C., and Wamera, E. (2018). Men and boys in sanitation and hygiene: A desk-based review. CLTS Knowledge Hub and Learning Paper, Institute of Development Studies.CBGA, U. (2011). Total sanitation campaign (TSC). budgeting for change series, 2011. Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability; Social Policy, Planning, Monitoring and evaluation (SPPME), UNICEFCharles, K. K. and Luoh, M. C. (2010). Male incarceration, the marriage market, and female outcomes. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(3):614–627Chiappori, P.-A., Dias, M. C., and Meghir, C. (2018). The marriage market, labor supply, and education choice. Journal of Political Economy, 126(S1):S26–S72Chiappori, P.-A., Iyigun, M., and Weiss, Y. (2009). Investment in schooling and the marriage market. American Economic Review, 99(5):1689–1713Chiappori, P.-A., Oreffice, S., and Quintana-Domeque, C. (2012). Fatter attraction: anthropometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage market. Journal of Political Economy, 120(4):659–695.Chiappori, P.-A., Salanié, B., and Weiss, Y. (2017). Partner choice, investment in children, and the marital college premium. American Economic Review, 107(8):2109–67Choo, E. and Siow, A. (2006). Who marries whom and why. Journal of political Economy, 114(1):175–201Clasen, T., Boisson, S., Routray, P., Torondel, B., Bell, M., Cumming, O., Ensink, J., Freeman, M., Jenkins, M., Odagiri, M., et al. (2014). Effectiveness of a rural sanitation programme on diarrhoea, soiltransmitted helminth infection, and child malnutrition in Odisha, India: A cluster-randomised trial. The Lancet Global Health, 2(11):e645–e653Cox, O. C. (1940). Sex ratio and marital status among negroes. American Sociological Review, 6(5):937–947Crocker, J. (2016). Teachers and sanitation promotion: An assessment of community-led total sanitation in Ethiopia. Environmental Science and Technology, 50(12)Crocker, J., Abodoo, E., Asamani, D., Domapielle, W., Gyapong, B., and Bartram, J. (2016). Impact evaluation of training Natural Leaders during a Community-Led Total sanitation intervention: A clusterrandomized field trial in Ghana. Environ. Sci. Technol., 50(16):8867–8875Das Gupta, M., Zhenghua, J., Bohua, L., Zhenming, X., Chung, W., and Hwa-Ok, B. (2003). Why is son preference so persistent in East and South Asia? A cross-country study of China, India and the Republic of Korea. The Journal of Development Studies, 40:153–187Desai, S. and Andrist, L. (2010). Erratum: Fatter attraction: Anthropometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage market. Demography, 47:667–687Easterlin, R. A. (1961). The American baby boom in historical perspective. American Economic Review, 51(5):869–911Fernández, R. and Wong, J. C. (2017). Free to leave? A welfare analysis of divorce regimes. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(3):72–115Garn, J. V., Sclar, G. D., Freeman, M. C., Penakalapati, G., Alexander, K. T., Brooks, P., Rehfuess, E. A., Boisson, S., Medlicott, K. O., and Clasen, T. F. (2017). The impact of sanitation interventions on latrine coverage and latrine use: A systematic review and meta-analysis. International journal of hygiene and environmental health, 220(2):329–340Gautam, S. (2017). Household Demand in the Presence of Externalities: Model and Applications. PhD thesis, University College London, United KingdomGautam, S. (2020). Quantifying welfare effects in the presence of externalities: An ex-ante evaluation of sanitation interventions. Working Paper, Washington University in St. LouisGreenwood, J., Guner, N., Kocharkov, G., and Santos, C. (2016). Technology and the changing family: A unified model of marriage, divorce, educational attainment, and married female labor-force participation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 8(1):1–41Grossbard, S. (1993). On the economics of marriage-a theory of marriage, labor and divorce. MPRA Paper, 1832Guiteras, R., Levinsohn, J., and Mobarak, A. M. (2015). Sanitation subsidies. encouraging sanitation investment in the developing world: A cluster-randomized trial. Science, 348(6237):903–906Gupta, B. (2014). Where have all the brides gone? Son preference and marriage in India over the twentieth century. The Economic History Review, 67(1):1–24Hammer, J. S. and Spears, D. (2016). Village sanitation and children’s human capital: evidence from a randomized experiment by the Maharashtra government. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6580Hener, T. and Wilson, T. (2018). Marital age gaps and educational homogamy-evidence from a compulsory schooling reform in the UK. Technical report, ifo Working PaperHitsch, G. J., Hortaçsu, A., and Ariely, D. (2010). Matching and sorting in online dating. American Economic Review, 100(1):130–63Iyigun, M. and Walsh, R. P. (2007). Endogenous gender power, household labor supply and the demographic transition. Journal of Development Economics, 82(1):138–155Jaggi, T. (2001). The economics of dowry: Causes and effects of an Indian tradition. University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics, 5(1):2Kone, Z. L., Liu, M. 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Columbia University, Job Market Paperinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURenghttps://www.dropbox.com/s/zn0u9hwb9i375el/ABGR_Sept2021_draft.pdf?dl=0https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/019624.htmlhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Augsburg, BrittaBaquero, Juan PabloGautam, SanghmitraRodríguez Lesmes, Paul Andrésoai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/325712021-10-01T03:02:56Z

Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign

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