Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab

Estudiamos si las oportunidades para extraer rentas en un trabajo afectan el tipo de personas que se sienten atraídas por él en términos de su integridad subyacente. Lo hacemos en un experimento de laboratorio en el que los participantes eligen entre dos contratos que involucran diferentes tareas. I...

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Fecha de publicación:: 2020

Institución:: Universidad del Rosario

Repositorio:: Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario

Idioma:: spa

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network_acronym_str	EDOCUR2
network_name_str	Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
title	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
spellingShingle	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab Corrupción Selección Oportunidades de extracción de alquileres Economía del personal Administración pública Problemas sociales & bienestar social en general C91 D73 M5 Corruption Selection Rent extraction opportunities Personnel economics
title_short	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
title_full	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
title_fullStr	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
title_full_unstemmed	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
title_sort	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv	Corrupción Selección Oportunidades de extracción de alquileres Economía del personal Administración pública Problemas sociales & bienestar social en general C91 D73 M5 Corruption Selection Rent extraction opportunities Personnel economics
topic	Corrupción Selección Oportunidades de extracción de alquileres Economía del personal Administración pública Problemas sociales & bienestar social en general C91 D73 M5 Corruption Selection Rent extraction opportunities Personnel economics
description	Estudiamos si las oportunidades para extraer rentas en un trabajo afectan el tipo de personas que se sienten atraídas por él en términos de su integridad subyacente. Lo hacemos en un experimento de laboratorio en el que los participantes eligen entre dos contratos que involucran diferentes tareas. Introducimos experimentalmente la posibilidad de injerto en uno de ellos y estudiamos la clasificación de los sujetos en los contratos en función de una medida de honestidad incentivada. Encontramos que el contrato corruptible cambia la composición de los sujetos porque atrae a los individuos más deshonestos y repele a los más honestos. Además, observamos un injerto extenso cuando la oportunidad está disponible. Introducimos una estrategia de aleatorización doble para desenredar la medida en que el robo responde a la selección negativa antes mencionada oa incentivos puros (netos de selección). Encontramos que, en este contexto, la selección es el principal impulsor del injerto. Nuestros resultados tienen implicaciones políticas claras para frenar la corrupción.
publishDate	2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv	2020-05-24 2020-05-26T22:03:48Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv	Brassiolo, Pablo; Estrada, Ricardo; Fajardo, Gustavo; Vargas F., Juan (2020) Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab. Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Documentos de trabajo economía. 28 pp. https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_24370 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24370
identifier_str_mv	Brassiolo, Pablo; Estrada, Ricardo; Fajardo, Gustavo; Vargas F., Juan (2020) Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab. Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Documentos de trabajo economía. 28 pp.
url	https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_24370 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24370
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv	spa
language	spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv	https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/018179.html
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
rights_invalid_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv	28 application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv	Abbink, K. and D. Serra (2012): “Chapter 4 Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab,” Research in Experimental Economics, 15, 77–115. Ashraf, N., O. Bandiera, and S. Lee (2018): “Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services,” LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 88175, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library. Banerjee, R., T. Baul, and T. Rosenblat (2015): “On Self Selection of the Corrupt into the Public Sector,” Economics Letters, 127, 43 – 46. Barfort, S., N. A. Harmon, F. Hjorth, and A. L. Olsen (2019): “Sustaining Honesty in Public Service: The Role of Selection,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11, 96–123. Benabou, R. and J. Tirole ´ (2011): “Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 805–855. Besley, T. (2005): “Political Selection,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 43–60. Dal Bo, E., F. Finan, and M. A. Rossi (2013): “Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 1169–1218. Deserranno, E. (2019): “Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11, 277–317. Ferraz, C. and F. Finan (2009): “Motivating politicians: The impacts of monetary incentives on quality and performance,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research. Finan, F., B. Olken, and R. Pande (2017): “Chapter 6 - The Personnel Economics of the Developing State,” in Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, ed. by A. V. Banerjee and E. Duflo, North-Holland, vol. 2 of Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, 467 – 514. Fischbacher, U. and F. Follmi-Heusi ¨ (2013): “Lies In Disguise: An Experimental Study On Cheating,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 525–547. Gallego, J. A., M. Prem, and J. F. Vargas (2020): “Corruption in the Times of Pandemia,” Available at SSRN 3600572. Hanna, R. and S.-Y. Wang (2017): “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9, 262–90. Karlan, D. and J. Zinman (2009): “Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment,” Econometrica, 77, 1993–2008. Olken, B. A. (2007): “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” Journal of Political Economy, 115, 200–249. Olken, B. A. and R. Pande (2012): “Corruption in Developing Countries,” Annual Review of Economics, 4, 479–509. Svensson, J. (2005): “Eight Questions about Corruption,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 19–42. instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
instname_str	Universidad del Rosario
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collection	Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
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spelling	Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the LabCorrupciónSelecciónOportunidades de extracción de alquileresEconomía del personalAdministración públicaProblemas sociales & bienestar social en generalC91D73M5CorruptionSelectionRent extraction opportunitiesPersonnel economicsEstudiamos si las oportunidades para extraer rentas en un trabajo afectan el tipo de personas que se sienten atraídas por él en términos de su integridad subyacente. Lo hacemos en un experimento de laboratorio en el que los participantes eligen entre dos contratos que involucran diferentes tareas. Introducimos experimentalmente la posibilidad de injerto en uno de ellos y estudiamos la clasificación de los sujetos en los contratos en función de una medida de honestidad incentivada. Encontramos que el contrato corruptible cambia la composición de los sujetos porque atrae a los individuos más deshonestos y repele a los más honestos. Además, observamos un injerto extenso cuando la oportunidad está disponible. Introducimos una estrategia de aleatorización doble para desenredar la medida en que el robo responde a la selección negativa antes mencionada oa incentivos puros (netos de selección). Encontramos que, en este contexto, la selección es el principal impulsor del injerto. Nuestros resultados tienen implicaciones políticas claras para frenar la corrupción.We study whether opportunities to extract rents in a job affect the type of individuals who are attracted to it in terms of their underlying integrity. We do so in a laboratory experiment in which participants choose between two contracts that involve different tasks. We experimentally introduce the possibility of graft in one of them and study the sorting of subjects across contracts based on an incentivized measure of honesty. We find that the corruptible contract changes the composition of subjects because it attracts the most dishonest individuals and repels the most honest ones. In addition, we observe extensive graft when the opportunity is available. We introduce a double randomization strategy to disentangle the extent of which stealing responds to the aforementioned negative selection or to pure incentives (net of selection). We find that, in this setting, selection is the main driver of graft. Our results have clear policy implications to curb corruption.2020-05-242020-05-26T22:03:48Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_804228application/pdfBrassiolo, Pablo; Estrada, Ricardo; Fajardo, Gustavo; Vargas F., Juan (2020) Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab. Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Documentos de trabajo economía. 28 pp.https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_24370 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24370Abbink, K. and D. Serra (2012): “Chapter 4 Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab,” Research in Experimental Economics, 15, 77–115.Ashraf, N., O. Bandiera, and S. Lee (2018): “Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services,” LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 88175, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.Banerjee, R., T. Baul, and T. Rosenblat (2015): “On Self Selection of the Corrupt into the Public Sector,” Economics Letters, 127, 43 – 46.Barfort, S., N. A. Harmon, F. Hjorth, and A. L. Olsen (2019): “Sustaining Honesty in Public Service: The Role of Selection,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11, 96–123.Benabou, R. and J. Tirole ´ (2011): “Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 805–855.Besley, T. (2005): “Political Selection,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 43–60.Dal Bo, E., F. Finan, and M. A. Rossi (2013): “Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 1169–1218.Deserranno, E. (2019): “Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11, 277–317.Ferraz, C. and F. Finan (2009): “Motivating politicians: The impacts of monetary incentives on quality and performance,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.Finan, F., B. Olken, and R. Pande (2017): “Chapter 6 - The Personnel Economics of the Developing State,” in Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, ed. by A. V. Banerjee and E. Duflo, North-Holland, vol. 2 of Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, 467 – 514.Fischbacher, U. and F. Follmi-Heusi ¨ (2013): “Lies In Disguise: An Experimental Study On Cheating,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 525–547.Gallego, J. A., M. Prem, and J. F. Vargas (2020): “Corruption in the Times of Pandemia,” Available at SSRN 3600572.Hanna, R. and S.-Y. Wang (2017): “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9, 262–90.Karlan, D. and J. Zinman (2009): “Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment,” Econometrica, 77, 1993–2008.Olken, B. A. (2007): “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” Journal of Political Economy, 115, 200–249.Olken, B. A. and R. Pande (2012): “Corruption in Developing Countries,” Annual Review of Economics, 4, 479–509.Svensson, J. (2005): “Eight Questions about Corruption,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 19–42.instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspahttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/018179.htmlhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Fajardo, GustavoBrassiolo, PabloVargas Duque, Juan FernandoEstrada, Ricardooai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/243702023-02-15T03:05:17Z

Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab

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