Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation

This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox—the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election—is an o...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2018
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/28926
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73948-9
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/28926
Palabra clave:
Beyond the Turnout Paradox
The Political Economy of Electoral Participation
Electoral Politics
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Restringido (Acceso a grupos específicos)
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oai_identifier_str oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/28926
network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
spelling 6b66d1cb-22e7-41bf-914e-37fa2abbd857-12020-08-28T15:50:08Z2020-08-28T15:50:08Z2018-04-14This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox—the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election—is an overstated problem, and that, contrary to widespread belief, game-theoretic models of elections with highly realistic parameters are compatible with high turnout. The author applies the method of stability sets to the study of voting games so as to characterize the behavior of electoral turnout in response to the game’s structural parameters. To illustrate the power and potential of this framework, the author then develops a politico-economic model that generates testable theories about the way in which the modern welfare state and redistribution of wealth can shape the patterns of biased turnout that exist in most democracies. By turning a classic problem of rational choice into a source of new methods of analysis this Brief allows game theory to intervene in relevant conversations about the political economy of electoral participation, creating an opportunity for formal methods to make a welcome contribution to the discipline. As such, this Brief will be of use to scholars and student of political science, economics, political economy, and public policy, especially those who work in the tradition of formal methods.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73948-9ISBN: 978-3-319-73947-2EISBN: 978-3-319-73948-9https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/28926engSpringer NatureBeyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participationBeyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation, ISBN: 978-3-319-73947-2; EISBN: 978-3-319-73948-9, (2018); 93 pp.https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319739472Restringido (Acceso a grupos específicos)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecBeyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participationinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURBeyond the Turnout ParadoxThe Political Economy of Electoral ParticipationElectoral PoliticsBeyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participationMás allá de la paradoja de la participación electoral: la economía política de la participación electoralbookLibrohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33Medina, Luis Fernando10336/28926oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/289262021-06-03 00:49:43.737https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
dc.title.TranslatedTitle.spa.fl_str_mv Más allá de la paradoja de la participación electoral: la economía política de la participación electoral
title Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
spellingShingle Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
Beyond the Turnout Paradox
The Political Economy of Electoral Participation
Electoral Politics
title_short Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
title_full Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
title_fullStr Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
title_full_unstemmed Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
title_sort Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Beyond the Turnout Paradox
The Political Economy of Electoral Participation
Electoral Politics
topic Beyond the Turnout Paradox
The Political Economy of Electoral Participation
Electoral Politics
description This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox—the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election—is an overstated problem, and that, contrary to widespread belief, game-theoretic models of elections with highly realistic parameters are compatible with high turnout. The author applies the method of stability sets to the study of voting games so as to characterize the behavior of electoral turnout in response to the game’s structural parameters. To illustrate the power and potential of this framework, the author then develops a politico-economic model that generates testable theories about the way in which the modern welfare state and redistribution of wealth can shape the patterns of biased turnout that exist in most democracies. By turning a classic problem of rational choice into a source of new methods of analysis this Brief allows game theory to intervene in relevant conversations about the political economy of electoral participation, creating an opportunity for formal methods to make a welcome contribution to the discipline. As such, this Brief will be of use to scholars and student of political science, economics, political economy, and public policy, especially those who work in the tradition of formal methods.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2018-04-14
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-08-28T15:50:08Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-08-28T15:50:08Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv book
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Libro
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73948-9
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv ISBN: 978-3-319-73947-2
EISBN: 978-3-319-73948-9
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/28926
url https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73948-9
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/28926
identifier_str_mv ISBN: 978-3-319-73947-2
EISBN: 978-3-319-73948-9
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation, ISBN: 978-3-319-73947-2; EISBN: 978-3-319-73948-9, (2018); 93 pp.
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319739472
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Restringido (Acceso a grupos específicos)
rights_invalid_str_mv Restringido (Acceso a grupos específicos)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Springer Nature
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv Beyond the turnout paradox: The political economy of electoral participation
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.none.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
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