Essays on equity research and informational decisions

Estudio empíricamente cómo funciona el sesgo confirmatorio para señales fuertes y contradictorias utilizando datos de analistas del lado de la venta. Primero modelé un agente que es propenso al sesgo confirmatorio y cuya tarea es valorar un stock basado en una señal, e introduzco los efectos de la f...

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Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2021
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/31670
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_31670
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/31670
Palabra clave:
Actualización bayesiana
Mala interpretación
A priori pesimista
Pronóstico optimista
Incentivos comerciales
Credibilidad del analista
Inversores receptivos
Inversores ingenuos
Parámetros aleatorios
Servicios de acceso abierto
Proveedores de suscripción
Cuotas de mercado
Economía
Bayesian updating
Misinterpretation
Pessimistic prior
Optimistic forecast
Trading incentives
Analyst's credibility
Responsive investors
Naive investors
Random parameters
Open access services
Subscription providers
Market shares
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)
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network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Essays on equity research and informational decisions
dc.title.TranslatedTitle.spa.fl_str_mv Ensayos sobre valoración de acciones y decisiones informativas
title Essays on equity research and informational decisions
spellingShingle Essays on equity research and informational decisions
Actualización bayesiana
Mala interpretación
A priori pesimista
Pronóstico optimista
Incentivos comerciales
Credibilidad del analista
Inversores receptivos
Inversores ingenuos
Parámetros aleatorios
Servicios de acceso abierto
Proveedores de suscripción
Cuotas de mercado
Economía
Bayesian updating
Misinterpretation
Pessimistic prior
Optimistic forecast
Trading incentives
Analyst's credibility
Responsive investors
Naive investors
Random parameters
Open access services
Subscription providers
Market shares
title_short Essays on equity research and informational decisions
title_full Essays on equity research and informational decisions
title_fullStr Essays on equity research and informational decisions
title_full_unstemmed Essays on equity research and informational decisions
title_sort Essays on equity research and informational decisions
dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv Florez-Acosta, Jorge
Gómez Portilla, Karoll
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv Actualización bayesiana
Mala interpretación
A priori pesimista
Pronóstico optimista
Incentivos comerciales
Credibilidad del analista
Inversores receptivos
Inversores ingenuos
Parámetros aleatorios
Servicios de acceso abierto
Proveedores de suscripción
Cuotas de mercado
topic Actualización bayesiana
Mala interpretación
A priori pesimista
Pronóstico optimista
Incentivos comerciales
Credibilidad del analista
Inversores receptivos
Inversores ingenuos
Parámetros aleatorios
Servicios de acceso abierto
Proveedores de suscripción
Cuotas de mercado
Economía
Bayesian updating
Misinterpretation
Pessimistic prior
Optimistic forecast
Trading incentives
Analyst's credibility
Responsive investors
Naive investors
Random parameters
Open access services
Subscription providers
Market shares
dc.subject.ddc.spa.fl_str_mv Economía
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Bayesian updating
Misinterpretation
Pessimistic prior
Optimistic forecast
Trading incentives
Analyst's credibility
Responsive investors
Naive investors
Random parameters
Open access services
Subscription providers
Market shares
description Estudio empíricamente cómo funciona el sesgo confirmatorio para señales fuertes y contradictorias utilizando datos de analistas del lado de la venta. Primero modelé un agente que es propenso al sesgo confirmatorio y cuya tarea es valorar un stock basado en una señal, e introduzco los efectos de la fuerza de la señal relajando la suposición de Rabin y Schrag (1999) de una severidad de sesgo constante. Posteriormente, utilizo los precios objetivo para medir el sesgo de pronóstico y el crecimiento de las ganancias por acción como señales, y retrocedo el sesgo de pronóstico de los analistas sobre diferentes deciles de señales favorables interactuadas con el sesgo de pronóstico negativo previo en un modelo de datos de panel dinámico. Encuentro que los analistas no reaccionan positivamente a las señales favorables cuando el anterior es pesimista, excepto por señales suficientemente fuertes que hacen que los analistas emitan precios objetivo más optimistas.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2021-06-22T20:14:24Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2021-06-22T20:14:24Z
dc.date.created.none.fl_str_mv 2021-06-15
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv doctoralThesis
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06
dc.type.document.spa.fl_str_mv Tesis
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Tesis de doctorado
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_31670
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/31670
url https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_31670
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/31670
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv 104 pp.
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.department.spa.fl_str_mv Facultad de Economía
dc.publisher.program.spa.fl_str_mv Doctorado en Economía
institution Universidad del Rosario
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spelling Florez-Acosta, Jorge98708888600Gómez Portilla, Karoll2432bb72-cd09-4242-9474-282e4c1dc18f600Astaiza-Gómez, José GabrielDoctor en EconomíaFull timecc6d49ee-6305-4bdb-84fd-ab9f0feceb5b6002021-06-22T20:14:24Z2021-06-22T20:14:24Z2021-06-15Estudio empíricamente cómo funciona el sesgo confirmatorio para señales fuertes y contradictorias utilizando datos de analistas del lado de la venta. Primero modelé un agente que es propenso al sesgo confirmatorio y cuya tarea es valorar un stock basado en una señal, e introduzco los efectos de la fuerza de la señal relajando la suposición de Rabin y Schrag (1999) de una severidad de sesgo constante. Posteriormente, utilizo los precios objetivo para medir el sesgo de pronóstico y el crecimiento de las ganancias por acción como señales, y retrocedo el sesgo de pronóstico de los analistas sobre diferentes deciles de señales favorables interactuadas con el sesgo de pronóstico negativo previo en un modelo de datos de panel dinámico. Encuentro que los analistas no reaccionan positivamente a las señales favorables cuando el anterior es pesimista, excepto por señales suficientemente fuertes que hacen que los analistas emitan precios objetivo más optimistas.I empirically study how confirmatory bias works for strong and contradictory signals using data on sell-side analysts. I first model an agent who is prone to confirmatory bias and whose task is to value a stock based on a signal, and introduce the effects of the signal strength by relaxing Rabin and Schrag's (1999) assumption of a constant bias severity. Afterwards I use target prices to measure forecast bias and the growth in Earnings Per Share as signals, and regress analysts' forecast bias over different deciles of favorable signals interacted with prior negative forecast bias in a dynamic panel data model. I find that analysts do not react positively to favorable signals when the prior is pessimistic, except for suffciently strong signals which cause analysts to issue more optimistic target prices.Colciencias104 pp.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_31670 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/31670engUniversidad del RosarioFacultad de EconomíaDoctorado en EconomíaAbierto (Texto Completo)EL AUTOR, manifiesta que la obra objeto de la presente autorización es original y la realizó sin violar o usurpar derechos de autor de terceros, por lo tanto la obra es de exclusiva autoría y tiene la titularidad sobre la misma. PARGRAFO: En caso de presentarse cualquier reclamación o acción por parte de un tercero en cuanto a los derechos de autor sobre la obra en cuestión, EL AUTOR, asumirá toda la responsabilidad, y saldrá en defensa de los derechos aquí autorizados; para todos los efectos la universidad actúa como un tercero de buena fe. EL AUTOR, autoriza a LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO, para que en los términos establecidos en la Ley 23 de 1982, Ley 44 de 1993, Decisión andina 351 de 1993, Decreto 460 de 1995 y demás normas generales sobre la materia, utilice y use la obra objeto de la presente autorización. -------------------------------------- POLITICA DE TRATAMIENTO DE DATOS PERSONALES. Declaro que autorizo previa y de forma informada el tratamiento de mis datos personales por parte de LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO para fines académicos y en aplicación de convenios con terceros o servicios conexos con actividades propias de la academia, con estricto cumplimiento de los principios de ley. Para el correcto ejercicio de mi derecho de habeas data cuento con la cuenta de correo habeasdata@urosario.edu.co, donde previa identificación podré solicitar la consulta, corrección y supresión de mis datos.http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Abarbanell, J. S. and Bernard, V. L. (1992). 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