Bandwagon and Snob effects : A Model of observable consumer behavior

The independence of preferences, normally assumed in consumer theory, is rather problematic when it comes to explaining observable consumer behavior. One of the most notorious cases is when the desire for status affects the purchasing decision of consumers; this can be seen in Leibenstein's Ban...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2017
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/18201
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18201
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18201
Palabra clave:
Bandwagon effect
Snob effect
Endogenous preferences
Python simulation
Consumer Behavior
Administración general
Comportamiento del consumidor
Perfilación del consumidor
Modelos econométricos
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)
Description
Summary:The independence of preferences, normally assumed in consumer theory, is rather problematic when it comes to explaining observable consumer behavior. One of the most notorious cases is when the desire for status affects the purchasing decision of consumers; this can be seen in Leibenstein's Bandwagon and Snob effects. Here I present and simulate a dynamic model of interdependent preferences for an economy of two representative consumers with different income levels and two goods, of which one provides status. I start from the demand functions derived from a member of the Bergson Family of utility functions, and non-linear adjustment formulas based on the Bandwagon and Snob effects that modify the weights in the utility function period by period. The results of the Python simulation suggest convergence to spefi c optimal demands the goods: the low-income consumer ends up sacri ficing part of his/her consumption of the market basket status-driven consumption.