On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for pla...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22336
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22336
- Palabra clave:
- Altruism
Blame
Psychological games
Reciprocity
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
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1fcbe764-78f0-446d-b095-3f98d77cd1ca0575baf2-9d88-41c3-a9bb-7bbc5427fb643597436002020-05-25T23:56:08Z2020-05-25T23:56:08Z2017The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for player j to judge whether or not player i is kind to him, player j has to put himself in the position of player i, and ask if he would act in a manner that is worse than what he believes player i does. If player j would act in a worse manner than player i, then we say that player j does not blame player i. If, however, player j would be nicer than player i, then we say that player j blames player i. We believe this notion is a natural, intuitive and empirically functional way to explain the motives of people engaging in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we test this concept by using data from two laboratory experiments and find significant support for the theory. © 2017 Elsevier Inc.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.0061095723500220531https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22336engAcademic Press Inc.9262Journal of Economic TheoryVol. 169Journal of Economic Theory, ISSN:10957235, 00220531, Vol.169,(2017); pp. 62-92https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85012024100&doi=10.1016%2fj.jet.2017.01.006&partnerID=40&md5=9ea5c56e8a4a20ea356429f68e5a26feAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURAltruismBlamePsychological gamesReciprocityOn blame and reciprocity: Theory and experimentsarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Çelen B.Schotter A.Blanco, MarianaORIGINAL1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdfapplication/pdf524555https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/8cae3912-c017-4f48-805e-3cec57a11660/download4300222a57f72aa5ffc9c60e7e1df627MD51TEXT1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdf.txt1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain100776https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/e6023214-af75-456c-b196-73443ab4b400/downloada9559a7cc6363da12a864670cf9fcb06MD52THUMBNAIL1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdf.jpg1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4368https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/53cc059e-ea56-44ba-99cc-0f7b8ba800db/downloadd2745ed06836cacd2721f262f07a7f3fMD5310336/22336oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/223362022-05-02 07:37:16.130187https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co |
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments |
title |
On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments |
spellingShingle |
On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments Altruism Blame Psychological games Reciprocity |
title_short |
On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments |
title_full |
On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments |
title_fullStr |
On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments |
title_full_unstemmed |
On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments |
title_sort |
On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments |
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv |
Altruism Blame Psychological games Reciprocity |
topic |
Altruism Blame Psychological games Reciprocity |
description |
The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for player j to judge whether or not player i is kind to him, player j has to put himself in the position of player i, and ask if he would act in a manner that is worse than what he believes player i does. If player j would act in a worse manner than player i, then we say that player j does not blame player i. If, however, player j would be nicer than player i, then we say that player j blames player i. We believe this notion is a natural, intuitive and empirically functional way to explain the motives of people engaging in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we test this concept by using data from two laboratory experiments and find significant support for the theory. © 2017 Elsevier Inc. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv |
2017 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-05-25T23:56:08Z |
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2020-05-25T23:56:08Z |
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv |
article |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv |
Artículo |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
10957235 00220531 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22336 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22336 |
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10957235 00220531 |
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eng |
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eng |
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92 |
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62 |
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Economic Theory |
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv |
Vol. 169 |
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Economic Theory, ISSN:10957235, 00220531, Vol.169,(2017); pp. 62-92 |
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https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85012024100&doi=10.1016%2fj.jet.2017.01.006&partnerID=40&md5=9ea5c56e8a4a20ea356429f68e5a26fe |
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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Abierto (Texto Completo) |
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Academic Press Inc. |
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Universidad del Rosario |
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