On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for pla...

Full description

Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2017
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22336
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22336
Palabra clave:
Altruism
Blame
Psychological games
Reciprocity
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)
id EDOCUR2_194b29eb762d76321f20ab22d070d3b4
oai_identifier_str oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22336
network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
spelling 1fcbe764-78f0-446d-b095-3f98d77cd1ca0575baf2-9d88-41c3-a9bb-7bbc5427fb643597436002020-05-25T23:56:08Z2020-05-25T23:56:08Z2017The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for player j to judge whether or not player i is kind to him, player j has to put himself in the position of player i, and ask if he would act in a manner that is worse than what he believes player i does. If player j would act in a worse manner than player i, then we say that player j does not blame player i. If, however, player j would be nicer than player i, then we say that player j blames player i. We believe this notion is a natural, intuitive and empirically functional way to explain the motives of people engaging in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we test this concept by using data from two laboratory experiments and find significant support for the theory. © 2017 Elsevier Inc.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.0061095723500220531https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22336engAcademic Press Inc.9262Journal of Economic TheoryVol. 169Journal of Economic Theory, ISSN:10957235, 00220531, Vol.169,(2017); pp. 62-92https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85012024100&doi=10.1016%2fj.jet.2017.01.006&partnerID=40&md5=9ea5c56e8a4a20ea356429f68e5a26feAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURAltruismBlamePsychological gamesReciprocityOn blame and reciprocity: Theory and experimentsarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Çelen B.Schotter A.Blanco, MarianaORIGINAL1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdfapplication/pdf524555https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/8cae3912-c017-4f48-805e-3cec57a11660/download4300222a57f72aa5ffc9c60e7e1df627MD51TEXT1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdf.txt1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain100776https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/e6023214-af75-456c-b196-73443ab4b400/downloada9559a7cc6363da12a864670cf9fcb06MD52THUMBNAIL1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdf.jpg1-s2-0-S0022053117300078-main.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4368https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/53cc059e-ea56-44ba-99cc-0f7b8ba800db/downloadd2745ed06836cacd2721f262f07a7f3fMD5310336/22336oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/223362022-05-02 07:37:16.130187https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
title On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
spellingShingle On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
Altruism
Blame
Psychological games
Reciprocity
title_short On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
title_full On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
title_fullStr On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
title_full_unstemmed On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
title_sort On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Altruism
Blame
Psychological games
Reciprocity
topic Altruism
Blame
Psychological games
Reciprocity
description The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for player j to judge whether or not player i is kind to him, player j has to put himself in the position of player i, and ask if he would act in a manner that is worse than what he believes player i does. If player j would act in a worse manner than player i, then we say that player j does not blame player i. If, however, player j would be nicer than player i, then we say that player j blames player i. We believe this notion is a natural, intuitive and empirically functional way to explain the motives of people engaging in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we test this concept by using data from two laboratory experiments and find significant support for the theory. © 2017 Elsevier Inc.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2017
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-25T23:56:08Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-25T23:56:08Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 10957235
00220531
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22336
url https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22336
identifier_str_mv 10957235
00220531
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 92
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 62
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Journal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 169
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Journal of Economic Theory, ISSN:10957235, 00220531, Vol.169,(2017); pp. 62-92
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85012024100&doi=10.1016%2fj.jet.2017.01.006&partnerID=40&md5=9ea5c56e8a4a20ea356429f68e5a26fe
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Academic Press Inc.
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/8cae3912-c017-4f48-805e-3cec57a11660/download
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/e6023214-af75-456c-b196-73443ab4b400/download
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/53cc059e-ea56-44ba-99cc-0f7b8ba800db/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv 4300222a57f72aa5ffc9c60e7e1df627
a9559a7cc6363da12a864670cf9fcb06
d2745ed06836cacd2721f262f07a7f3f
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
_version_ 1814167658831020032