Frankfurt-Counterexamples and the w-Defense
A criticism of Frankfurt-counterexamples presented by David Widerker and known as the W-defense has been resilient for years and has been considered one of the strongest challenges these counterexamples have to face. In this paper I offer a defense of Frankfurt counterexamples from Widerker's a...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23909
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23909
- Palabra clave:
- David Widerker
Frankfurt counterexamples
Moral Responsibility
Principle of Alternative Expectations
Principle of Alternative Possibilities
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
| Summary: | A criticism of Frankfurt-counterexamples presented by David Widerker and known as the W-defense has been resilient for years and has been considered one of the strongest challenges these counterexamples have to face. In this paper I offer a defense of Frankfurt counterexamples from Widerker's attack by presenting a dilemma for the Principle of Alternative Expectations, it's main premise: either on the one hand, this principle rests on the Kantian maxim ought implies can, which makes the principle, and Widerker's whole argument, redundant and unnecessary; or the principle does not rest on such maxim, but then there is no good reason to accept it as valid. |
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