Rebellion, Repression and Welfare

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2011
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23835
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2011.594598
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23835
Palabra clave:
Inequality
Markov perfect equilibrium
Rebellion
Repression
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)
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spelling 799502236002020-05-26T00:05:52Z2020-05-26T00:05:52Z2011I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression-driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society. © 2011 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2011.5945981476826710242694https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23835eng579No. 5563Defence and Peace EconomicsVol. 22Defence and Peace Economics, ISSN:14768267, 10242694, Vol.22, No.5 (2011); pp. 563-579https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84859074430&doi=10.1080%2f10242694.2011.594598&partnerID=40&md5=ce99d7bbe2dc28760530e496bb14962aAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURInequalityMarkov perfect equilibriumRebellionRepressionRebellion, Repression and WelfarearticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando10336/23835oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/238352022-05-02 07:37:17.556249https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Rebellion, Repression and Welfare
title Rebellion, Repression and Welfare
spellingShingle Rebellion, Repression and Welfare
Inequality
Markov perfect equilibrium
Rebellion
Repression
title_short Rebellion, Repression and Welfare
title_full Rebellion, Repression and Welfare
title_fullStr Rebellion, Repression and Welfare
title_full_unstemmed Rebellion, Repression and Welfare
title_sort Rebellion, Repression and Welfare
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Inequality
Markov perfect equilibrium
Rebellion
Repression
topic Inequality
Markov perfect equilibrium
Rebellion
Repression
description I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression-driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society. © 2011 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2011
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-26T00:05:52Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-26T00:05:52Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2011.594598
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 14768267
10242694
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23835
url https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2011.594598
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23835
identifier_str_mv 14768267
10242694
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 579
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv No. 5
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 563
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Defence and Peace Economics
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 22
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Defence and Peace Economics, ISSN:14768267, 10242694, Vol.22, No.5 (2011); pp. 563-579
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84859074430&doi=10.1080%2f10242694.2011.594598&partnerID=40&md5=ce99d7bbe2dc28760530e496bb14962a
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
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