More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy

While a large literature defines and diagnoses the effects of weak institutions, much less is known about how to improve them. In developing countries, there are often many signs of weak institutions that undermine reciprocal behavior between the population and the state. This paper studies the effe...

Full description

Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2023
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/41974
Acceso en línea:
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/41974
Palabra clave:
State capacity
Intrinsic reciprocity
Peace agreement
Public goods
Colombia
State capacity
Intrinsic reciprocity
Peace agreement
Public goods
Colombia
Rights
License
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
id EDOCUR2_08403e4b11b85d4eefec1a32c0c05b58
oai_identifier_str oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/41974
network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
dc.title.TranslatedTitle.none.fl_str_mv ¿Más bienes públicos, más reciprocidad política? Datos de una economía en situación de post-conflicto
title More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
spellingShingle More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
State capacity
Intrinsic reciprocity
Peace agreement
Public goods
Colombia
State capacity
Intrinsic reciprocity
Peace agreement
Public goods
Colombia
title_short More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
title_full More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
title_fullStr More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
title_full_unstemmed More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
title_sort More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv Seither Afonso, Julia
Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv State capacity
Intrinsic reciprocity
Peace agreement
Public goods
Colombia
topic State capacity
Intrinsic reciprocity
Peace agreement
Public goods
Colombia
State capacity
Intrinsic reciprocity
Peace agreement
Public goods
Colombia
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv State capacity
Intrinsic reciprocity
Peace agreement
Public goods
Colombia
description While a large literature defines and diagnoses the effects of weak institutions, much less is known about how to improve them. In developing countries, there are often many signs of weak institutions that undermine reciprocal behavior between the population and the state. This paper studies the effect of community-driven post-conflict development programs in Colombia (called PDET) on citizen's reciprocal behavior, especially tax compliance and participation in social mobilization. To the extent that PDET affects these outcomes, I document the extent to which these type of programs improve state capacity. Using a \textit{difference-in-differences} strategy, I compare municipalities with a close probability of being treated with treated ones to estimate causal effects. The results (due to data restrictions) show a short-term increase on protests fostered by weak institutions characteristics of the treated municipalities. On the other hand, tax revenue is influenced by an upsurge in property and sales taxes. This effect may be attributed to factors related to tax compliance, but it is not the sole plausible explanation. This provides evidence on how governments can generate new relationships on state capacity and tax compliance with historically harmful pasts societies.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.created.none.fl_str_mv 2023-12-14
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01-11T20:47:59Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01-11T20:47:59Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv bachelorThesis
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1f
dc.type.document.none.fl_str_mv Trabajo de grado
dc.type.spa.none.fl_str_mv Trabajo de grado
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/41974
url https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/41974
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.none.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 38 pp
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.department.spa.fl_str_mv Facultad de Economía
dc.publisher.program.spa.fl_str_mv Maestría en Economía
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.bibliographicCitation.none.fl_str_mv Abadie, A., & Imbens, G. W. (2016). Matching on the estimated propensity score. Econometrica, 84 (2), 781–807.
Acemoglu, D. (2005). Politics and economics in weak and strong states. Journal of monetary Economics, 52 (7), 1199–1226.
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2017). The emergence of weak, despotic and inclusive states (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Santos, R. J. (2013). The monopoly of violence: Evidence from colombia. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11 (suppl 1), 5–44.
Aghion, P., Alesina, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Endogenous political institutions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2), 565–611.
Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., & Hansen, C. (2014, May). High-dimensional methods and inference on structural and treatment effects. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28 (2), 29-50. Retrieved from https://www .aeaweb .org/articles ?id=10 .1257/jep .28 .2 .29 DOI: 10.1257/jep.28.2.29
Bernal, C., Prem, M., Vargas, J. F., & Ortiz, M. (2023). Peaceful entry: Entrepreneurship dynamics during colombia’s peace agreement. Journal of Development Economics, 103119.
Besley, T. (2020). State capacity, reciprocity, and the social contract. Econometrica, 88 (4), 1307– 1335.
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics. American economic review , 99 (4), 1218–1244.
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2010). State capacity, conflict, and development. Econometrica, 78 (1), 1–34.
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2014). Why do developing countries tax so little? Journal of economic perspectives, 28 (4), 99–120.
Dalton, R. J. (2013). Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies. Cq Press.
Fergusson, L. (2019). Who wants violence? the political economy of conflict and state building in colombia. Cuadernos de Econom ́ıa, 38 (78), 671–699.
Fergusson, L., Molina, C. A., & Robinson, J. A. (2022). The weak state trap. Economica, 89 (354), 293–331.
Fergusson, L., Querubin, P., Ruiz, N. A., & Vargas, J. F. (2021). The real winner’s curse. American Journal of Political Science, 65 (1), 52–68.
Fergusson, L., Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Vargas, J. F. (2016). The need for enemies. The Economic Journal , 126 (593), 1018–1054.
Gelvez-Ferreira, J., & Johnson, M. (2023). “los nadies y las nadies”: The effect of peace-building on political behavior in colombia.
Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The logic of violence in civil war. Cambridge University Press.
Machado, F., Scartascini, C., & Tommasi, M. (2011). Political institutions and street protests in latin america. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55 (3), 340–365.
Namen, O., Prem, M., Vargas, J. F., et al. (2020). The human capital peace dividend. Forthcoming at Journal of Human Resources.
Oquist, P. H. (1980). Violence, conflict, and politics in colombia. Academic Press. Retrieved from http://ez.urosario.edu.co/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=edshlc&AN=edshlc.000917600.4&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site
Perilla, S., Prem, M., Purroy, M. E., & Vargas, J. F. (2022). How peace saves lives: Evidence from colombia. Available at SSRN 3977483 .
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002). Political economics: explaining economic policy. MIT press. Registro ́Unico de v ́ıctimas. (2023). https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico -de-victimas-ruv-34487. (Accessed: 25 05 2023)
Scartascini, C., & Tommasi, M. (2012). The making of policy: institutionalized or not? American Journal of Political Science, 56 (4), 787–801.
Sobel, J. (2005). Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of economic literature, 43 (2), 392–436.
Tabellini, G. (2008). The scope of cooperation: Values and incentives. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (3), 905–950.
Tibshirani, R. (1996). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology, 58 (1), 267–288.
dc.source.instname.none.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/fc60dcea-ec41-4eff-a756-88acbae2a543/download
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/70f03ff7-709b-4c35-8896-0ebbc149c13c/download
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/943c1a47-3b45-49ac-9106-710aed8ca16a/download
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/a79d8128-f89a-402b-92f7-17ca5d43bd56/download
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/9402825f-b4fe-4259-ae85-389eb0016434/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv b2825df9f458e9d5d96ee8b7cd74fde6
35fdc4780a420ce7acc6eebf87ca89ba
3b6ce8e9e36c89875e8cf39962fe8920
5bb6429be1fdfea5270d160e8dc29801
5d548d36588d4f83ac30f5c0fbdf5640
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
_version_ 1814167602174361600
spelling Seither Afonso, Julia1177604600Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando79950223600Garzón Restrepo, Juan EstebanMagíster en EconomíaMaestríaFull timed3ec289d-058c-49f5-9e0e-280098eb663d-12024-01-11T20:47:59Z2024-01-11T20:47:59Z2023-12-14While a large literature defines and diagnoses the effects of weak institutions, much less is known about how to improve them. In developing countries, there are often many signs of weak institutions that undermine reciprocal behavior between the population and the state. This paper studies the effect of community-driven post-conflict development programs in Colombia (called PDET) on citizen's reciprocal behavior, especially tax compliance and participation in social mobilization. To the extent that PDET affects these outcomes, I document the extent to which these type of programs improve state capacity. Using a \textit{difference-in-differences} strategy, I compare municipalities with a close probability of being treated with treated ones to estimate causal effects. The results (due to data restrictions) show a short-term increase on protests fostered by weak institutions characteristics of the treated municipalities. On the other hand, tax revenue is influenced by an upsurge in property and sales taxes. This effect may be attributed to factors related to tax compliance, but it is not the sole plausible explanation. This provides evidence on how governments can generate new relationships on state capacity and tax compliance with historically harmful pasts societies.While a large literature defines and diagnoses the effects of weak institutions, much less is known about how to improve them. In developing countries, there are often many signs of weak institutions that undermine reciprocal behavior between the population and the state. This paper studies the effect of community-driven post-conflict development programs in Colombia (called PDET) on citizen's reciprocal behavior, especially tax compliance and participation in social mobilization. To the extent that PDET affects these outcomes, I document the extent to which these type of programs improve state capacity. Using a \textit{difference-in-differences} strategy, I compare municipalities with a close probability of being treated with treated ones to estimate causal effects. The results (due to data restrictions) show a short-term increase on protests fostered by weak institutions characteristics of the treated municipalities. On the other hand, tax revenue is influenced by an upsurge in property and sales taxes. This effect may be attributed to factors related to tax compliance, but it is not the sole plausible explanation. This provides evidence on how governments can generate new relationships on state capacity and tax compliance with historically harmful pasts societies.38 ppapplication/pdfhttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/41974spaUniversidad del RosarioFacultad de EconomíaMaestría en EconomíaAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternationalAbierto (Texto Completo)EL AUTOR, manifiesta que la obra objeto de la presente autorización es original y la realizó sin violar o usurpar derechos de autor de terceros, por lo tanto la obra es de exclusiva autoría y tiene la titularidad sobre la misma. PARGRAFO: En caso de presentarse cualquier reclamación o acción por parte de un tercero en cuanto a los derechos de autor sobre la obra en cuestión, EL AUTOR, asumirá toda la responsabilidad, y saldrá en defensa de los derechos aquí autorizados; para todos los efectos la universidad actúa como un tercero de buena fe. EL AUTOR, autoriza a LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO, para que en los términos establecidos en la Ley 23 de 1982, Ley 44 de 1993, Decisión andina 351 de 1993, Decreto 460 de 1995 y demás normas generales sobre la materia, utilice y use la obra objeto de la presente autorización. -------------------------------------- POLITICA DE TRATAMIENTO DE DATOS PERSONALES. Declaro que autorizo previa y de forma informada el tratamiento de mis datos personales por parte de LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO para fines académicos y en aplicación de convenios con terceros o servicios conexos con actividades propias de la academia, con estricto cumplimiento de los principios de ley. Para el correcto ejercicio de mi derecho de habeas data cuento con la cuenta de correo habeasdata@urosario.edu.co, donde previa identificación podré solicitar la consulta, corrección y supresión de mis datos.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Abadie, A., & Imbens, G. W. (2016). Matching on the estimated propensity score. Econometrica, 84 (2), 781–807.Acemoglu, D. (2005). Politics and economics in weak and strong states. Journal of monetary Economics, 52 (7), 1199–1226.Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2017). The emergence of weak, despotic and inclusive states (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Santos, R. J. (2013). The monopoly of violence: Evidence from colombia. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11 (suppl 1), 5–44.Aghion, P., Alesina, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Endogenous political institutions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2), 565–611.Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., & Hansen, C. (2014, May). High-dimensional methods and inference on structural and treatment effects. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28 (2), 29-50. Retrieved from https://www .aeaweb .org/articles ?id=10 .1257/jep .28 .2 .29 DOI: 10.1257/jep.28.2.29Bernal, C., Prem, M., Vargas, J. F., & Ortiz, M. (2023). Peaceful entry: Entrepreneurship dynamics during colombia’s peace agreement. Journal of Development Economics, 103119.Besley, T. (2020). State capacity, reciprocity, and the social contract. Econometrica, 88 (4), 1307– 1335.Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics. American economic review , 99 (4), 1218–1244.Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2010). State capacity, conflict, and development. Econometrica, 78 (1), 1–34.Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2014). Why do developing countries tax so little? Journal of economic perspectives, 28 (4), 99–120.Dalton, R. J. (2013). Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies. Cq Press.Fergusson, L. (2019). Who wants violence? the political economy of conflict and state building in colombia. Cuadernos de Econom ́ıa, 38 (78), 671–699.Fergusson, L., Molina, C. A., & Robinson, J. A. (2022). The weak state trap. Economica, 89 (354), 293–331.Fergusson, L., Querubin, P., Ruiz, N. A., & Vargas, J. F. (2021). The real winner’s curse. American Journal of Political Science, 65 (1), 52–68.Fergusson, L., Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Vargas, J. F. (2016). The need for enemies. The Economic Journal , 126 (593), 1018–1054.Gelvez-Ferreira, J., & Johnson, M. (2023). “los nadies y las nadies”: The effect of peace-building on political behavior in colombia.Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The logic of violence in civil war. Cambridge University Press.Machado, F., Scartascini, C., & Tommasi, M. (2011). Political institutions and street protests in latin america. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55 (3), 340–365.Namen, O., Prem, M., Vargas, J. F., et al. (2020). The human capital peace dividend. Forthcoming at Journal of Human Resources.Oquist, P. H. (1980). Violence, conflict, and politics in colombia. Academic Press. Retrieved from http://ez.urosario.edu.co/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=edshlc&AN=edshlc.000917600.4&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=sitePerilla, S., Prem, M., Purroy, M. E., & Vargas, J. F. (2022). How peace saves lives: Evidence from colombia. Available at SSRN 3977483 .Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002). Political economics: explaining economic policy. MIT press. Registro ́Unico de v ́ıctimas. (2023). https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico -de-victimas-ruv-34487. (Accessed: 25 05 2023)Scartascini, C., & Tommasi, M. (2012). The making of policy: institutionalized or not? American Journal of Political Science, 56 (4), 787–801.Sobel, J. (2005). Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of economic literature, 43 (2), 392–436.Tabellini, G. (2008). The scope of cooperation: Values and incentives. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (3), 905–950.Tibshirani, R. (1996). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology, 58 (1), 267–288.instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURState capacityIntrinsic reciprocityPeace agreementPublic goodsColombiaState capacityIntrinsic reciprocityPeace agreementPublic goodsColombiaMore public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy¿Más bienes públicos, más reciprocidad política? Datos de una economía en situación de post-conflictobachelorThesisTrabajo de gradoTrabajo de gradohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1fFacultad de EconomíaLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain1483https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/fc60dcea-ec41-4eff-a756-88acbae2a543/downloadb2825df9f458e9d5d96ee8b7cd74fde6MD54ORIGINALEvidence_from_a_post_conflict_economy_Garzón_Restrepo_Juan_Esteban.pdfEvidence_from_a_post_conflict_economy_Garzón_Restrepo_Juan_Esteban.pdfapplication/pdf2232964https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/70f03ff7-709b-4c35-8896-0ebbc149c13c/download35fdc4780a420ce7acc6eebf87ca89baMD55CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8899https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/943c1a47-3b45-49ac-9106-710aed8ca16a/download3b6ce8e9e36c89875e8cf39962fe8920MD56TEXTEvidence_from_a_post_conflict_economy_Garzón_Restrepo_Juan_Esteban.pdf.txtEvidence_from_a_post_conflict_economy_Garzón_Restrepo_Juan_Esteban.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain68619https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/a79d8128-f89a-402b-92f7-17ca5d43bd56/download5bb6429be1fdfea5270d160e8dc29801MD57THUMBNAILEvidence_from_a_post_conflict_economy_Garzón_Restrepo_Juan_Esteban.pdf.jpgEvidence_from_a_post_conflict_economy_Garzón_Restrepo_Juan_Esteban.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2751https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/9402825f-b4fe-4259-ae85-389eb0016434/download5d548d36588d4f83ac30f5c0fbdf5640MD5810336/41974oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/419742024-05-14 20:58:48.061http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttps://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.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

Publicaciones similares