The politics of resource booms
This paper develops a simple model to investigate how resource-driven economic booms shape the equilibrium political institutions of resource-rich societies and influence the likelihood of experiencing civil war. In our model a strong government apparatus favors property rights protection but also m...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2012
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/10994
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10994
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10994
- Palabra clave:
- Producción
Resource Boom
Autocracy
Democracy
Civil War
Economía
Política económica
Democracia
Guerra::Aspectos Económicos
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
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The politics of resource boomsProducciónResource BoomAutocracyDemocracyCivil WarEconomíaPolítica económicaDemocraciaGuerra::Aspectos EconómicosThis paper develops a simple model to investigate how resource-driven economic booms shape the equilibrium political institutions of resource-rich societies and influence the likelihood of experiencing civil war. In our model a strong government apparatus favors property rights protection but also makes the state more powerful and hence may induce predatory autocratic regimes over democracy. We characterize the parameter space of each political outcome in terms of the type of the available natural resources. Economic booms based on resources that are privately exploited empower the citizens and tend to ease democratic transitions. In contrast, booms based on resources exploited by the state tend to favor more dictatorial regimes. Finally, economic booms based on resources that can be exploited either by the state or by private citizens incite preemptive actions by both parties that may result in civil war. We discuss the predictions of the model using historical and contemporary examples.Universidad del RosarioFacultad de Economía20122015-10-09T19:23:14Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_804224 páginasRecurso electrónicoapplication/pdfDocumentohttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10994 Universidad del Rosariohttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10994instname:Universidad del Rosarioinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspahttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/010082.htmlhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Mahmud, Ahmed-SaberDe Luca, GiacomoVargas Duque, Juan Fernandooai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/109942021-06-03T00:46:37Z |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The politics of resource booms |
title |
The politics of resource booms |
spellingShingle |
The politics of resource booms Producción Resource Boom Autocracy Democracy Civil War Economía Política económica Democracia Guerra::Aspectos Económicos |
title_short |
The politics of resource booms |
title_full |
The politics of resource booms |
title_fullStr |
The politics of resource booms |
title_full_unstemmed |
The politics of resource booms |
title_sort |
The politics of resource booms |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Producción Resource Boom Autocracy Democracy Civil War Economía Política económica Democracia Guerra::Aspectos Económicos |
topic |
Producción Resource Boom Autocracy Democracy Civil War Economía Política económica Democracia Guerra::Aspectos Económicos |
description |
This paper develops a simple model to investigate how resource-driven economic booms shape the equilibrium political institutions of resource-rich societies and influence the likelihood of experiencing civil war. In our model a strong government apparatus favors property rights protection but also makes the state more powerful and hence may induce predatory autocratic regimes over democracy. We characterize the parameter space of each political outcome in terms of the type of the available natural resources. Economic booms based on resources that are privately exploited empower the citizens and tend to ease democratic transitions. In contrast, booms based on resources exploited by the state tend to favor more dictatorial regimes. Finally, economic booms based on resources that can be exploited either by the state or by private citizens incite preemptive actions by both parties that may result in civil war. We discuss the predictions of the model using historical and contemporary examples. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012 2015-10-09T19:23:14Z |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10994 Universidad del Rosario http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10994 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10994 http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10994 |
identifier_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/010082.html |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
24 páginas Recurso electrónico application/pdf Documento |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad del Rosario instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
instname_str |
Universidad del Rosario |
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Universidad del Rosario |
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Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
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Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
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1803710500120297472 |