Offensive realism, differentiation theory, and the war in Ukraine
In this article, I shall demonstrate that several of the arguments made in favour of an offensive realist explanation of Russian actions in Ukraine as part of a power balancing process are inconsistent both with available empirical knowledge of the conflict in Ukraine and with the structural logic p...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2019
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22170
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0150-4
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22170
- Palabra clave:
- Civil society
Empirical analysis
Political conflict
Political power
Political theory
War
Russian federation
Ukraine
Conflict
Differentiation theory
Offensive realism
Russia
Ukraine
World society
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
| Summary: | In this article, I shall demonstrate that several of the arguments made in favour of an offensive realist explanation of Russian actions in Ukraine as part of a power balancing process are inconsistent both with available empirical knowledge of the conflict in Ukraine and with the structural logic postulated by offensive realist theory itself. Rather than a conflict about power in a material sense, I will argue that the war in Ukraine is better understood as a conflict about the incompatibility of the Russian state structure to cope with the imperatives of functional differentiation as understood by theories of world society. © 2018, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., part of Springer Nature. |
|---|