What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia

Using a large survey database on the corporate governance practices of privately held Colombian firms, we investigate why firms have boards, and how that choice and the balance of power among the board, controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders affect the trade-offs between control, liquid...

Full description

Autores:
Villalonga, Belén
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Cáceres, Neila
Tipo de recurso:
Article of investigation
Fecha de publicación:
2019
Institución:
Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
Repositorio:
Repositorio CESA
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5087
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5087
https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12224
Palabra clave:
Institutional investors
Firm
Rights
License
Acceso Restringido
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oai_identifier_str oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5087
network_acronym_str CESA2
network_name_str Repositorio CESA
repository_id_str
spelling Villalonga, Belén9451a0b4-1d0f-409d-9f47-eb885e18167f600Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea5b131e3f-c0dd-4f10-9a55-2909001129ad600Guzmán Vásquez, Alexandere6815926-cc9f-40cd-bb0e-f549642805cf600Cáceres, Neilaaf79e227-1a29-4770-863b-bd0946f16f92600Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]Villalonga, Belén [6506527390]Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]Cáceres, Neila [55842808000]2023-06-21T22:23:05Z2023-06-21T22:23:05Z20190046-3892http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5087instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESAreponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESArepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/1755-053Xhttps://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12224engWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.Institutional investorsFirmWhat are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombiaarticlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARThttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32Acceso Restringidohttp://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecUsing a large survey database on the corporate governance practices of privately held Colombian firms, we investigate why firms have boards, and how that choice and the balance of power among the board, controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders affect the trade-offs between control, liquidity, and growth and, ultimately, firm performance. We find that the probability of having a board increases with the number of shareholders and in family firms. When the preferences of controlling and minority shareholders diverge, as with respect to capital structure and dividend policy, boards support controlling shareholders’ decisions, thereby exacerbating the agency conflict between the two groups of shareholders.https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048Xhttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=6506527390https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55207224400https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55842808000482537573Financial Management10726/5087oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/50872023-10-02 19:24:08.249metadata only accessBiblioteca Digital - CESAbiblioteca@cesa.edu.co
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia
title What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia
spellingShingle What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia
Institutional investors
Firm
title_short What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia
title_full What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia
title_fullStr What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia
title_full_unstemmed What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia
title_sort What are boards for? Evidence from closely held firms in Colombia
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Villalonga, Belén
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Cáceres, Neila
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Villalonga, Belén
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Cáceres, Neila
dc.contributor.orcid.none.fl_str_mv Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]
dc.contributor.scopus.none.fl_str_mv Villalonga, Belén [6506527390]
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]
Cáceres, Neila [55842808000]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Institutional investors
Firm
topic Institutional investors
Firm
description Using a large survey database on the corporate governance practices of privately held Colombian firms, we investigate why firms have boards, and how that choice and the balance of power among the board, controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders affect the trade-offs between control, liquidity, and growth and, ultimately, firm performance. We find that the probability of having a board increases with the number of shareholders and in family firms. When the preferences of controlling and minority shareholders diverge, as with respect to capital structure and dividend policy, boards support controlling shareholders’ decisions, thereby exacerbating the agency conflict between the two groups of shareholders.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2019
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-21T22:23:05Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-21T22:23:05Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coar.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.driver.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.redcol.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART
dc.type.coarversion.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32
format http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0046-3892
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5087
dc.identifier.instname.none.fl_str_mv instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
dc.identifier.reponame.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
dc.identifier.repourl.none.fl_str_mv repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1755-053X
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12224
identifier_str_mv 0046-3892
instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
1755-053X
url http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5087
https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12224
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationvolume.none.fl_str_mv 48
dc.relation.citationissue.none.fl_str_mv 2
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv 537
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv 573
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.none.fl_str_mv Financial Management
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.rights.local.none.fl_str_mv Acceso Restringido
dc.rights.coar.none.fl_str_mv http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/
rights_invalid_str_mv Acceso Restringido
http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
institution Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
repository.name.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digital - CESA
repository.mail.fl_str_mv biblioteca@cesa.edu.co
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