Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority?minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Co...
- Autores:
-
González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of investigation
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2014
- Institución:
- Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio CESA
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5124
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5124
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448
- Palabra clave:
- Agency problems
Closely held firms
Colombia
Dividend policy
Family firms
- Rights
- License
- Acceso Restringido
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González Ferrero, Maximiliano6ed7fd26-b94e-4e41-8b5a-390d5ef46a5f600Guzmán Vásquez, Alexandere6815926-cc9f-40cd-bb0e-f549642805cf600Pombo Vejarano, Carlos2cfec6e5-7fdf-4005-a09a-ef60c3f1fa84600Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea5b131e3f-c0dd-4f10-9a55-2909001129ad600González Ferrero, Maximiliano [0000-0002-8675-6911]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]Pombo Vejarano, Carlos [0000-0001-9638-0586]Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]González Ferrero, Maximiliano [17434254200]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]Pombo Vejarano, Carlos [6603836065]Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]2023-06-21T22:23:11Z2023-06-21T22:23:11Z2014-06-110894-4865http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5124instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESAreponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESArepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/1741-6248https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448engSage Publications IncAgency problemsClosely held firmsColombiaDividend policyFamily firmsFamily involvement and dividend policy in closely held firmsarticlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARThttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32Acceso Restringidohttp://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecThis article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority?minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Colombian companies, we find that family involvement in management does not affect dividend policy; family involvement in both ownership and control through pyramids affects dividend policy negatively; and family involvement in control through disproportionate board representation affects dividend policy positively. Thus, family influence on agency problems, and hence on dividend policy as a mitigating mechanism, varies depending on family involvement.https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8675-6911https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048Xhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9638-0586https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=17434254200https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55207224400https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=6603836065https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700274365385Family Business Review10726/5124oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/51242023-09-18 10:03:53.279metadata only accessBiblioteca Digital - CESAbiblioteca@cesa.edu.co |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms |
title |
Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms |
spellingShingle |
Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms Agency problems Closely held firms Colombia Dividend policy Family firms |
title_short |
Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms |
title_full |
Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms |
title_fullStr |
Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms |
title_full_unstemmed |
Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms |
title_sort |
Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
González Ferrero, Maximiliano Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander Pombo Vejarano, Carlos Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea |
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv |
González Ferrero, Maximiliano Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander Pombo Vejarano, Carlos Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea |
dc.contributor.orcid.none.fl_str_mv |
González Ferrero, Maximiliano [0000-0002-8675-6911] Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X] Pombo Vejarano, Carlos [0000-0001-9638-0586] Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890] |
dc.contributor.scopus.none.fl_str_mv |
González Ferrero, Maximiliano [17434254200] Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400] Pombo Vejarano, Carlos [6603836065] Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700] |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Agency problems Closely held firms Colombia Dividend policy Family firms |
topic |
Agency problems Closely held firms Colombia Dividend policy Family firms |
description |
This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority?minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Colombian companies, we find that family involvement in management does not affect dividend policy; family involvement in both ownership and control through pyramids affects dividend policy negatively; and family involvement in control through disproportionate board representation affects dividend policy positively. Thus, family influence on agency problems, and hence on dividend policy as a mitigating mechanism, varies depending on family involvement. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-06-11 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-06-21T22:23:11Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-06-21T22:23:11Z |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
article |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
dc.type.coar.none.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.type.driver.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.redcol.none.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART |
dc.type.coarversion.none.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32 |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
0894-4865 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5124 |
dc.identifier.instname.none.fl_str_mv |
instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA |
dc.identifier.reponame.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA |
dc.identifier.repourl.none.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/ |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1741-6248 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448 |
identifier_str_mv |
0894-4865 instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/ 1741-6248 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5124 https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.citationvolume.none.fl_str_mv |
27 |
dc.relation.citationissue.none.fl_str_mv |
4 |
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv |
365 |
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv |
385 |
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.none.fl_str_mv |
Family Business Review |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec |
dc.rights.local.none.fl_str_mv |
Acceso Restringido |
dc.rights.coar.none.fl_str_mv |
http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/ |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Acceso Restringido http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Sage Publications Inc |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Sage Publications Inc |
institution |
Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digital - CESA |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
biblioteca@cesa.edu.co |
_version_ |
1793339965797564416 |