Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms

This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority?minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Co...

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Autores:
González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Tipo de recurso:
Article of investigation
Fecha de publicación:
2014
Institución:
Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
Repositorio:
Repositorio CESA
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5124
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5124
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448
Palabra clave:
Agency problems
Closely held firms
Colombia
Dividend policy
Family firms
Rights
License
Acceso Restringido
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oai_identifier_str oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5124
network_acronym_str CESA2
network_name_str Repositorio CESA
repository_id_str
spelling González Ferrero, Maximiliano6ed7fd26-b94e-4e41-8b5a-390d5ef46a5f600Guzmán Vásquez, Alexandere6815926-cc9f-40cd-bb0e-f549642805cf600Pombo Vejarano, Carlos2cfec6e5-7fdf-4005-a09a-ef60c3f1fa84600Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea5b131e3f-c0dd-4f10-9a55-2909001129ad600González Ferrero, Maximiliano [0000-0002-8675-6911]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]Pombo Vejarano, Carlos [0000-0001-9638-0586]Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]González Ferrero, Maximiliano [17434254200]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]Pombo Vejarano, Carlos [6603836065]Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]2023-06-21T22:23:11Z2023-06-21T22:23:11Z2014-06-110894-4865http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5124instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESAreponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESArepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/1741-6248https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448engSage Publications IncAgency problemsClosely held firmsColombiaDividend policyFamily firmsFamily involvement and dividend policy in closely held firmsarticlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARThttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32Acceso Restringidohttp://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecThis article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority?minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Colombian companies, we find that family involvement in management does not affect dividend policy; family involvement in both ownership and control through pyramids affects dividend policy negatively; and family involvement in control through disproportionate board representation affects dividend policy positively. Thus, family influence on agency problems, and hence on dividend policy as a mitigating mechanism, varies depending on family involvement.https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8675-6911https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048Xhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9638-0586https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=17434254200https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55207224400https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=6603836065https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700274365385Family Business Review10726/5124oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/51242023-09-18 10:03:53.279metadata only accessBiblioteca Digital - CESAbiblioteca@cesa.edu.co
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
title Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
spellingShingle Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
Agency problems
Closely held firms
Colombia
Dividend policy
Family firms
title_short Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
title_full Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
title_fullStr Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
title_full_unstemmed Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
title_sort Family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
dc.creator.fl_str_mv González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
dc.contributor.orcid.none.fl_str_mv González Ferrero, Maximiliano [0000-0002-8675-6911]
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos [0000-0001-9638-0586]
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]
dc.contributor.scopus.none.fl_str_mv González Ferrero, Maximiliano [17434254200]
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]
Pombo Vejarano, Carlos [6603836065]
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Agency problems
Closely held firms
Colombia
Dividend policy
Family firms
topic Agency problems
Closely held firms
Colombia
Dividend policy
Family firms
description This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority?minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Colombian companies, we find that family involvement in management does not affect dividend policy; family involvement in both ownership and control through pyramids affects dividend policy negatively; and family involvement in control through disproportionate board representation affects dividend policy positively. Thus, family influence on agency problems, and hence on dividend policy as a mitigating mechanism, varies depending on family involvement.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2014-06-11
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-21T22:23:11Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-21T22:23:11Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coar.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.driver.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.redcol.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART
dc.type.coarversion.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32
format http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0894-4865
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5124
dc.identifier.instname.none.fl_str_mv instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
dc.identifier.reponame.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
dc.identifier.repourl.none.fl_str_mv repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1741-6248
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448
identifier_str_mv 0894-4865
instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
1741-6248
url http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5124
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationvolume.none.fl_str_mv 27
dc.relation.citationissue.none.fl_str_mv 4
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv 365
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv 385
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.none.fl_str_mv Family Business Review
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.rights.local.none.fl_str_mv Acceso Restringido
dc.rights.coar.none.fl_str_mv http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/
rights_invalid_str_mv Acceso Restringido
http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Sage Publications Inc
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Sage Publications Inc
institution Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
repository.name.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digital - CESA
repository.mail.fl_str_mv biblioteca@cesa.edu.co
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